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With control over the Constitutional amendment procedure held tightly in the hands 
of the prime minister and a record of very few successful referendums in Australia, 
the idea of opening up the process by introduction of the citizen-initiated referendum 
presents itself. This paper considers two implications of CIR in particular — its 
tendency to confl ate constitutional law and ordinary law; and its encouragement of 
a ‘tyranny of the majority’. The paper concludes that any experiment with such a 
questionably democratic device should occur at the State rather than national level, 
and that important procedural safeguards be applied.
Commentators regularly bemoan the immutability of the Commonwealth Constitution.1 
Constitutional reform is made virtually impossible, a range of critics suggest, by a demanding 
amendment procedure that requires any proposed alteration to be submitted to the people in 
a national referendum where it must receive both a majority of the overall vote and a majority 
of votes in a majority of States.  Only 8 of 44 proposals have met that test in the entire 11 
decades since Federation — equating to a rather derisory 18 per cent ‘success’ rate. It is, 
though, a very high success rate compared with some countries. To take one not-very-
obscure example, the United States has managed only 27 amendments to its Constitution 
— indeed, only 17 if one discounts the original ten of 1792 that were part of the ratifi cation 
settlement — from an estimated 10,000 proposals put to Congress in the 222 years since 
ratifi cation (Bernstein and Angel 1993:169). At 0.27 per cent, that is a meagre success 
rate indeed — making 18 per cent look positively extravagant. Perhaps 18 per cent seems 
low to some people because they are unconsciously benchmarking it against the standard 
democratic rule of 50% +1. On that standard, 18 per cent is well short of a passing grade.  But, 
to borrow Justice Marshall’s famous declaration ‘it is a constitution we are expounding’ here,2
and the standard is hardly relevant. Constitutions have a special character as fundamental 
rather than ordinary law, with permanence as one of their distinguishing features. Permanence 
does not entail ossifi cation, but it does imply a much a more stringent test for alteration. 
Nonetheless, a good case could be made that over more than a century of enormous 
technological, economic, social and international change greater facility for amendment 
would be desirable. This paper provides a very brief introduction to the proposition that 
existing referendum requirements be radically expanded to allow citizens to initiate change. 
On the face of it, this is a highly democratic proposal — a form of ‘direct democracy’ that 
might address increasing concerns about public disenchantment with the familiar processes 
1
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of representative government (LeDuc 2003:19–20). However, the paper fi nds that the Citizen-
Initiated Referendum (CIR) device has implications for the relationship between fundamental 
and ordinary law, or rules and policy, and a highly ambiguous relationship to democracy that 
weigh against anything but the most cautious and limited experimentation.
Constitutional failure and remedy?
The closing section of the Commonwealth Constitution, s.128, requires any alteration to 
conform to the specifi ed procedure where parliament submits a proposal to the voters in a 
nationwide referendum.  It must receive the support of both a nationwide majority (simple) 
and a majority of voters in a majority of States (two thirds on existing numbers). There have 
been 18 referendums since Federation comprising 44 proposals, or referenda. The most 
recent attempt to amend the Constitution was the ‘republic referendum’ of 1999 where 
two questions were put to the people, neither receiving even a national majority let alone 
a majority in a majority of States. Five referenda have been defeated despite receiving a 
national majority (having fallen at the federalism hurdle), but that still leaves 31 of the 44 that 
failed both tests — including the previous referendum in 1988 where all four proposals were 
comprehensively rejected.
Explanations
It is an oft-repeated truism that proposals fail at referendum so frequently because they do 
not get the bipartisan support that evidence suggests is required.  But partisanship is what 
politics is all about and it scarcely needs saying that constitutions are political. To say that 
partisanship is the problem is to say very little, as is reference to a putative conservatism 
among Australian voters.  Applying Ockham’s razor, we might simply conclude that the rather 
lame record simply illustrates the triumph of good sense over bad proposals (Galligan 1999; 
2001; Miles 1999).  And of course, that immediately raises the question of what is it about the 
process that leads to so many bad proposals and, presumably, so few good ones? No less 
obvious than the question is the answer: an amendment procedure that excludes any means 
other than proposal by the federal parliament.  In a parliamentary system such as Australia’s, 
to grant the legislature that power is to create a very tight monopoly over the process — in 
effect to assign control to the prime minister. In this regard, the Commonwealth Constitution’s 
Section 128 was a surprisingly fl awed piece of constitutional design, particularly from a group 
of colonial politicians who had, in the largest part, little desire to tilt the playing fi eld in favour 
of the Commonwealth government. To be fair, the framers did not have a wide range of 
existing examples from which to draw inspiration.  The Americans had invented amendment 
procedures with the U.S. Constitution’s Article V, but the Canadians had sidestepped the 
issue (and thereby created a larger one) by doing without an amendment procedure for their 
Constitution at all.3
The CIR alternative
Obligatory referendums for constitutional change are a long established and widely practised 
technique for constitutional constraint — going back at least to the adoption of the world’s 
oldest constitution, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in 1780. 
Somewhat newer and less widely practised is the more radical notion of allowing the people 
to initiate proposals themselves, fi rst employed in late-nineteenth century Switzerland.  Such 
2
3 Finally rectifi ed in 1982 when the British North America Act of 1867 was ‘patriated’ as the Constitution Act, 1867.
PUBLIC POLICY
3
a move would certainly end the prime minister’s monopoly over the process.  While Australia 
prides itself on having been an international pioneer in regard to its early development of 
democratic rights and its adoption of the popular referendum for constitutional amendment, 
it falls well short of some other jurisdictions in respect of the people’s direct role in making law. 
Switzerland most famously and most importantly makes regular use of citizen initiative as well 
as, like Australia, requiring any government-initiated constitutional change to be approved 
by referendum.  In the US, half of all the States also employ the initiative, with South Dakota 
having led the way in 1898 and California adopting it in 1911. 
Australia has an extensive history of interest in CIR but as yet no attempts to introduce 
it have been successful (Williams and Chin 2000). Whether Australian democracy and 
constitutional practice would benefi t from introduction of this form of ‘direct democracy’ is 
an issue around which debate has sharply polarised.  In considering this question, this paper 
distinguishes between so-called ‘advisory referendums’ — sometimes called ‘plebiscites’ 
— where the results are not binding, and mandatory referendums proper where the results 
are binding on government.4  Advisory referendums are a widespread if not necessarily 
frequent practice and Australia has had its share at both national and State level.  Western 
Australia is particularly prominent in this regard, having held its constitutionally meaningless 
but nonetheless notable referendum on secession in 1933 (66 per cent in favour) and more 
recent referendums on such mundane policy matters as daylight saving and shop trading 
hours.  There is a persuasive argument that such opportunistic referendums subvert rather 
than enhance democratic practice in a system of representative government (e.g., Rahat 
2009; Setälä 2006) but advisory referendums are not the concern of this paper.5 The two 
defi ning principles of the referendum device this paper concerns itself with are: 1) that they 
are initiated by popular petition; and 2) that they are binding on government.
There is also distinction to be made between levels of government and types of law: CIR can 
be used at local, State or national level and it may be used for constitutional or statute law.  At 
the national level in Switzerland citizens can initiate a referendum to amend the constitution,6 
a provision that was adopted by referendum in 1891.  The same does not apply, however, to 
ordinary law. As far as statute law is concerned, citizens have constitutional power to demand 
a referendum on any existing Act if they can submit a petition with the required number of 
signatures within 100 days of ‘offi cial publication’ but they cannot initiate legislation.7 Direct 
democracy at the level of cantons and commune (municipal) level antedates the national 
provision, and there Swiss voters can typically initiate either constitutional amendment or 
ordinary law.  In some American States, citizens can initiate changes to the State Constitution 
as well as to statute law while, in others, use of the initiative is restricted to statute law. At 
the national level in the United States, neither option is available.  Indeed, no referendum of 
any sort has ever been held at a national level in the United States and Magleby (1995:42) 
describes the United States as being “one of only fi ve democracies which has never held a 
national referendum”.   
4 See LeDuc (2003:39) for a detailed typology. 
5 And in Australia there is, additionally, the absurdity of compulsory voting in non-binding advisory referendums.
6 Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, Arts. 138 & 139.
7 Art. 141.
THE CITIZEN-INITIATED REFERENDUM IN AUSTRALIA  
Although not often noted, Australia can look to one example much closer to home: in 1993, 
New Zealand legislated for the Citizen Initiated Referendum. It was, though, a peculiar half-
measure.  As one of the very few remaining liberal democracies lacking a codifi ed constitution 
and thus enjoying full parliamentary sovereignty, New Zealand not surprisingly chose to be 
the one country to adopt the advisory CIR (Parkinson 2001). 
The following discussion considers two implications of adopting CIR: the relationship between 
fundamental and ordinary law, and the question of how democratic a device it is.
Confl ating fundamental and ordinary law
Underlying the practice of liberal-democratic constitutionalism is the assumption of a 
hierarchy of laws: the ‘ordinary law’ of governments is legitimate by virtue of being produced in 
accordance with a ‘higher law’, fundamental or constitutional law. Fundamental law provides the 
framework of rules regulating the operation of the political system while ordinary law is the vehicle 
through which governments of the day give expression to policy.  By making it impossible for 
governments to engage in unilateral constitutional amendment, s.128 gives the Commonwealth 
Constitution the clear status of fundamental law. This distinction is tested by CIR.
In those rare cases where the initiative operates with respect to constitutional law but not 
statute law, as is the case at the national level in Switzerland, the tendency is to turn sub-
constitutional matters into constitutional ones. Citizens wanting to take the law into their 
own hands are naturally led to make whatever concern they have a constitutional concern. 
The 2009 initiative to prohibit minarets in Switzerland, for instance, inserted a clause into the 
federal Constitution.8  The practical distinction between fundamental law and ordinary law is 
thus blurred and the Constitution takes on a rather promiscuous character. Section 118a of 
the Swiss Constitution, inserted by CIR for instance, requires that “The Federation and the 
Cantons…ensure that consideration is given to complementary medicine”.  Switzerland is 
highly unusual, if not unique, in providing for constitutional but not legislative initiative. The 
rarity of this approach and its obviously infl ationary impact on the Constitution means that it 
is diffi cult to contemplate introduction of a CIR option for constitutional change in Australia 
without also introducing it for statute law. 
That means discussion of the merits of CIR as a constitutional tool cannot be separated from 
discussion of the merits of CIR as a law-making tool more broadly. The distinction between 
fundamental law and ordinary law is also blurred, however, when the initiative is available 
for both.  In those instances, any statutory change effected through the initiative is often 
protected from repeal or amendment by the referendum requirement; it is a type of superior 
law.  In addition, because any group with suffi cient motivation to collect the required number 
of signatures and run a state-wide campaign is likely to have a high level of commitment, 
confronted with the choice between legislative and constitutional impact they will naturally 
be drawn to the latter, more fundamental mode of enshrining their pet project.  We would 
expect this to be particularly the case where legislative initiatives can be amended or repealed 
by the legislature.  Magleby (1995:13) reports that this is the situation in most US cases and 
4
8 On 29 November 2009, the Swiss approved a citizen-initiated proposition to amend Article 72 of the Constitution 
by inserting a paragraph 3 that reads “The construction of minarets is prohibited”.
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predictably “Initiative sponsors in states that provide both the constitutional and statutory 
initiative will often submit their measure as a constitutional initiative because of its ‘more 
secure’ legal standing”. One deliberate deterrent to this kind of opportunism is to make 
the nominating threshold higher for constitutional proposals.  Illustrative is California, where 
nominations must garner signatures of 5 per cent of the total votes cast in the previous 
gubernatorial election for statutory propositions and 8 per cent for constitutional ones.9 
However, there is little incentive to constitutionalise in California since the Constitution, 
sec.10(c), permits legislative amendment or repeal of an initiative only if the initiative so allows 
or if approved by the voters in a referendum.
There is a natural tendency under such circumstances, then, for referendums to beget 
referendums. In California, the ballot papers bulge with propositions being put not by the 
people, but by the legislature for the simple fact that once a proposition has been adopted as 
law, any action by the legislature to repeal or amend must also be approved in referendum.  In 
1990, the explanatory pamphlet for voters In California was a self-defeating 224 pages long 
— largely as a consequence of the number of amendments being sought by the legislature 
(Magleby 1995:33).
How democratic is direct democracy?
The biggest question though must be what sort of policy it generates. One way to frame 
an answer to that question is to take an historical perspective.  The Swiss referendum and 
subsequently the initiative as well, were closely linked to its process of democratisation in the 
19th century (Fossedal 2001:87–90).  Similarly, in the U.S., the Initiative and Referendum, 
along with the Recall, date back to the heyday of democratic progressivism in the early 
period of modern democracy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Goebel 
2007).  Most U.S. States that adopted CIR did so, for instance, in the years 1898 to 1918 
(Magleby 1995:27; 2001). In this period, more democratic procedures typically meant more 
democratic outcomes. The majority was seeking greater infl uence over a political process that 
was heavily controlled by business elites and strongly resisted political, social and economic 
reform.  Working class political parties typically supported these measures, and indeed CIR 
was on the platform of the Australian Labor Party until the mid-1960s.  In Western Australia, 
the Scadden Labor government introduced an initiative and referendum Act in 1913.  It was 
passed by the Labor-controlled Legislative Assembly but rejected by the Legislative Council 
where, of course, Labor did not have the numbers.10 Typical of the reforms sought in this 
period in the United States was women’s suffrage, which, in four States, was introduced 
through CIR.  CIR went into abeyance through mid-century and when it returned, it did so 
with a new set of friends. 
9 ARTICLE 2:  VOTING, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM, AND RECALL SEC. 8.  (a) The initiative is the power of the 
electors to propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them.
 (b) An initiative measure may be proposed by presenting to the Secretary of State a petition that sets forth the text 
of the proposed statute or amendment to the Constitution and is certifi ed to have been signed by electors equal in 
number to 5 percent in the case of a statute, and 8 percent in the case of an amendment to the Constitution,
of the votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election.
10 Australian experiences are outlined in Williams and Chin (2000).
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Today, the relationship between CIR and democracy has reversed. More democratic 
procedures, in this sense, means less-democratic outcomes and the proponents of CIR 
are more likely — with some notable exceptions — to be from the political right, much less 
concerned about traditional democratic values and more concerned about reining in the 
democratic tendencies of ‘elites’ (e.g., Walker 1987). According to Magleby (1995), the 
initiative process in America rarely gives voice to the disadvantaged. “Absent from the initiative 
are issues of concern to the poor, the less educated, and those who lack political organization 
or fi nancial resources.  Instead, issues tend to refl ect the concerns of ideological or reform 
groups that have been unsuccessful in getting their way with the legislature”. Whether the 
initiative process is dominated by money is unclear (Smith 1998; cf. Gerber 1999).
CIR and Minority Rights
A comprehensive study published in 1997 examined every one of the initiatives put on the 
ballot paper across the American States between 1959 and 1993 that concerned matters 
of civil rights (Gamble 1997). There were 74 initiatives in total over this period, and all but 
six sought to reduce the rights of disadvantaged minorities. Those 68 proposals seeking to 
disadvantage minorities enjoyed a success rate of 78 per cent; now that is a passing grade 
— indeed a distinction. To put that in context, at 33 per cent, the success rate overall for 
initiatives in this period was substantially less than half of that fi gure.  As if to confi rm that 
analysis, California voters approved Proposition 187 in 1994 denying public education and 
social services to the State’s many illegal (Hispanic) immigrants. Similarly, it seems clear that 
the availability of CIR is the key variable distinguishing States that have adopted constitutional 
provisions banning same sex marriage and those that haven’t (Lupia et al. 2010).11
  
This might be dismissed as more refl ective of the peculiarities of American political culture, 
rather than the inherent dangers of direct democracy.  However, the 57 per cent support in 
July 2008 for the constitutional initiative to prohibit minarets in Switzerland — now Article 
72(3) of the Swiss Constitution, “The building of minarets is prohibited” — might suggest 
otherwise.   So also might the 53 per cent support among Swiss voters for the constitutional 
initiative for mandatory deportation of “criminal foreigners” in November 2010.  New Zealand’s 
CIR was the consolation prize for groups who had lost in their campaign to oppose the 
legalisation of homosexuality and who were supported by groups “opposed to the redress 
of Maori grievances” (Parkinson 2001:408). While neither of these examples comes near 
the American States for oppressive majoritarianism, they do suggest there is a broader 
tendency at work.  Perhaps James Madison’s was right to insistent on a very indirect and 
limited, or republican, style of democracy where populist passions would be fi ltered through 
a complex set of layered political institutions.  It is also one of the reasons why there is an 
inverse correlation between how informed citizens are and how much they support the use 
of referendum techniques (Anderson and Goodyear-Grant 2010).12
6
11 By showing that there is no underlying pattern of variation in preferences, the study demonstrates that the policy 
variation is not an instance of federalism allowing local communities to express local policy tastes.
12 The other reason being a greater confi dence in the effi cacy of government.
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One consequence of the fact that initiative operates at the State level in America and gets 
widely used in a highly ‘populist’ manner is that a large number of those that get approved by 
the voters subsequently get struck down by the Courts as either exceeding the constitutional 
authority of the State vis-à-vis Congress, or as contravening one or more of the rights 
guaranteed in various of the Amendments to the US Constitution. Of all the Propositions 
adopted in California from 1960 to 1980, only two “were not declared unconstitutional in 
whole or in part by state or federal courts” (Magleby 1995:40). This, of course, places the 
courts in direct opposition to the explicitly declared will of the majority of voters — an invidious 
position for the judiciary in a democratic society (Miller 2009).
CIR and Fiscal Policy
No event has generated as much attention for CIR as California’s Proposition 13 of 1978, 
which amended the State Constitution to include in s.13a the requirement that “The 
maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property shall not exceed one percent (1%) 
of the full cash value of such property”. For critics, this has been a prime example of the 
disastrous way CIR allows voters to impose policy limitations in isolation from broader policy 
concerns, fundamentally undermining in this case the quality of public provision (Schrag 
2006).  Similarly, direct democracy has been a strong contributor to fi scal conservatism in 
Switzerland. However, while ensuring that Switzerland remained a low-taxing society with 
a relatively small welfare state, CIR there seems to have also supported the kind of strong 
government role in developing productive infrastructure that has helped make the country 
such an economic success story (Fossedal 2001:102–4).
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Conclusion
There is broad consensus that the use of referendums and the practice of CIR is on the rise 
and that these forms of ‘direct democracy’ can be seen as one response to the apparently 
endemic disenchantment with representative government in liberal democracies (LeDuc 
2003; Mendelsohn and Parkin 2001).  It would also seem to be the case that where CIR is 
practised, voters like it (Haskell 2000:148).  CIR certainly has its thoughtful proponents (e.g., 
Barber 1984; Budge 1996; Matsusaka 2004; 2005; Saward 1998). It also has abundant 
critics (e.g., Broder 2000; Ellis 2002; Haskell 2000; Schrag 2006).  What does seem clear is 
that in its effect, CIR has gone from being a device a century ago through which politics was 
democratised to now being a populist device bearing shades of the tyranny of the majority. 
However, it must be said that this is much more the case in the American States than it is 
in Switzerland, where direct democracy is more deeply entrenched in political culture and 
functions as a complementary component of a highly successful system of representative 
government (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008; Linder 2010; Sager and Bühlmann 2009). 
If the Swiss and American experiences are anything to go by, this form of direct democracy 
is a bottom-up affair rather than something that one could sensibly contemplate introducing 
at the national level.  In Switzerland, direct democracy is practised to greater extent the 
closer one is to the local community. Cantonal direct democracy is stronger than national, 
and the more traditional communes have a history of the most democratic practice of all in 
their landsgemeinden or local community assemblies.  In the United States, CIR is exclusively 
a State and local procedure. This suggests that if Australia was going to experiment with 
direct democracy of this nature it would be best to begin by doing so at the State level, with 
the State constitutions. This is precisely the kind of experimentation that a federal system of 
government should allow us to engage in (Fenna 2010).
Regardless of the level at which it is practised, a great deal depends on how it is practised. 
As well as the issues raised above, there is also the general concern that making political and 
constitutional decisions through referendum militates strongly against a democratic process 
of deliberative consensus building (Chambers 2001; Clark 1998; Setälä 2006).  This suggests 
that any experimentation with CIR should be of a well-regulated type (Barber 1984; Cronin 
1999), where thresholds are high; number of referenda is strictly limited; eligible matters 
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One of the most prominent and popular commitments made during the 2007 federal 
election was the Labor Party’s pledge to ‘end the blame game’ affl icting Australian 
federalism and to reform Australia’s health system to meet demands of the 21st 
century. By early 2010 Labor’s campaign commitment gave rise to the proposed 
National Health and Hospital Network which has now been superseded by an 
alternative national health reform package  which won the preliminary support of State 
and Territory Premiers and Chief Ministers at a February 2011 Council of Australian 
Government (COAG) meeting. Given these developments this paper analyses the 
original NHHN proposal with a particular emphasis on evaluating its fi nancial viability 
and whether it was likely to improve the effi ciency of Australia’s health system. The 
paper concludes with a preliminary assessment of the ‘Gillard Model’ and the likely 
implications of its alternative funding model.
The Rudd Government will be remembered for failing to deliver an ambitious reform agenda 
spanning from climate change policy to tax reform and a host of varied proposals in between. 
One of the most prominent and popular commitments made during the 2007 federal election 
was the Labor Party’s pledge to ‘end the blame game’ affl icting Australian federalism and to 
reform Australia’s health system to meet demands of the 21st century (Roxon 2007; Watson 
and Browne 2008). Labor’s campaign commitment gave rise to the proposed National Health 
and Hospital Network (NHHN) as articulated in the Federal Financial Relations Amendment 
(National Health and Hospitals Network) Bill 2010 introduced just prior to the 2010 federal 
election. 
Despite NHHN legislation being reintroduced to the Senate in October 2010 Prime Minister 
Julia Gillard has since developed an alternative national health reform package (the ‘Gillard 
Model’ henceforth) which won the preliminary support of State and Territory Premiers and 
Chief Ministers at a February 2011 Council of Australian Government (COAG) meeting. Given 
these developments the majority of this paper is devoted to an analysis of the original NHHN 
proposal with a particular emphasis on evaluating its fi nancial viability and whether it was likely 
to improve the effi ciency of Australia’s health system. The paper concludes with a preliminary 
assessment of the Gillard Model and the likely implications of its alternative funding model.
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The original NHHN was a complex model with a number of interrelated dimensions.
This paper aims to present a preliminary analysis of its three most signifi cant elements:
1) Its fi nancial viability – Would the proposed network have met the likely short term 
cost of funding Australia’s public hospital system? Would the proposed network have 
altered the funding balance between the Commonwealth and States in relation to the 
public hospital system?
2) Would the proposed network have reduced demand for health services in Australia?
3) Would the proposed network have improved the effi ciency of the supply of health 
services in Australia?
Context for Reform
The cost of health care provision is increasing in real terms across all Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) economies and the impact of health 
infl ation on public fi nances represents a major policy challenge in all advanced democracies 
(OECD 2010). This broad trend is also clearly evident in Australia with total health expenditure 
as a proportion of GDP increasing from 6.3% in 1981-82 to 9.0% in 2008-09 (AIHW 2010: ix).
The fi nancial challenge associated with funding public hospital services is particularly acute 
in the context of Australian intergovernmental fi nancial relations, because State and Territory 
governments (henceforth ‘States’), with their small and declining revenue base, have primary 
responsibility for the funding and management of the public hospital system – the area of 
government expenditure subject to the greatest cost pressures (Banks 2008; Eccleston 
2008). The historical response to Australia’s vertical fi scal imbalance in the context of public 
hospital funding has been for the Commonwealth to provide Special Purpose Payments 
(SPPs) to the States under the auspices of Australian Health Care Agreements and, more 
recently, the National Healthcare Agreement (NHCA) SPP. Whilst SPPs have underpinned the 
fi nancial viability of Australia’s public hospital system (contributing $14.7 billion in 2010-11) 
the regime has been subject to a number of related criticisms.
First, in practice health SPPs negotiated under NHCA have not kept pace with the rate of health 
infl ation. As a consequence (and given their constitutional responsibility for the management 
of public hospitals) the States have been forced to increase their direct contribution to public 
hospital funding from 48.4 % in 1998-99 to 51.2% in 2008-09, while the Commonwealth’s 
contribution has decreased from 44.3% to 39.2% over the same period (AIHW 2010: 10). 
The balance has been provided from private sources. This trend has served as a catalyst 
for the current debate about the fi nancial sustainability of Australia’s public hospital system 
(Roxon 2007). 
At a political level, the relative decline of Commonwealth funding for public hospitals  combined 
with concerns about the quality and availability of public hospital care have served to increase 
intergovernmental debate in relation to health policy and management within Australia (Parkin 
and Anderson 2007: 304-05). The central objective of the NHHN has been to end this ‘blame 
game’ between the Commonwealth and States in the health care arena.
Finally, ineffi ciencies in health care provision in Australia have been exacerbated by the historic 
division of responsibility between the Commonwealth and the States for different elements of 




and Duckett 2008). The NHHN and the Gillard Model have a common ambition of improving 
the integration of health care delivery in Australia which may improve the overall effi ciency of 
the national health system, although critics argue that established program divisions between 
primary health, public hospital, private insurance and pharmaceutical funding are likely to 
remain.1
Macro-Financial Analysis: The fi nancial viability of the original NHHN
The intergovernmental accountability issues which have affl icted Australian health policy 
in recent decades have both governance and fi nancial dimensions. For example who has 
effective control over and responsibility for the provision of health services? And who funds 
the provision of health services? 
The analysis which follows explores the macro fi nancial implications of the NHHN by providing 
some indicative projections as to whether the proposed NHHN would have been adequately 
funded in the short term. This analysis aims to establish the extent to which the original model 
would have provided fi nancial relief to the States and whether Premiers were justifi ed in their 
concern about relinquishing as much as 30% of GST revenue to fund the NHHN.
By way of caveats, this analysis of the likely impact of the NHHN is based on the extrapolation 
of recently published Australian Institute of Health and Welfare data (AIHW 2010) on public 
hospital expenditure as well as Commonwealth Budget data (Treasury 2010) on projected 
Commonwealth health funding and GST revenues. As a baseline, the analysis assumes 
expenditure growth on public hospitals will continue at a nominal rate of 9.5% per annum 
(the trend rate 2004-09, AIHW 2009: 117). If the NHHN model was able to deliver more 
cost effective health services then these expenditure projections may be too pessimistic. 
However, in the absence of fi rm data on possible cost savings we believe it is prudent to 
assume the historical rate of cost infl ation. While we recognise the proposed NHHN had the 
ambition of funding the provision of health services beyond those delivered to public patients 
in public hospitals, it is fi rst important to establish whether the proposed regime would have 
been  likely to meet 60% of the anticipated non-private costs of running Australia’s public 
hospital system. The projections assume that the States’ contributions to the new funding 
pool would have been in accordance with the fi gures published in the Commonwealth’s 
Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook (Treasury 2010). Finally, the accuracy of fi nancial 
projections in relation to either model  is also limited by uncertainty surrounding how the 
proposed funding model will work in practice such as the determination of ‘effi cient prices’ 
for hospital treatments and training costs. Despite these qualifi cations, it is possible to make 
some tentative conclusions in relation to two threshold questions:
1) Would the Commonwealth’s forecast contributions to the NHHN (as outlined in the 
forward estimates in Treasury’s 010 Mid-Year Economic and Financial Outlook) have 
met the likely cost of funding Australia’s public hospital system? and
2) Would the proposed model have reduced the States’ fi nancial commitment to funding 
Australia’s public hospital system in relative terms?
1 We would like to thank one of the Journal’s anonymous reviewers for making this point.
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2010-11 47.0 NA 14.7 NA 36.9 NA NA NA NA
2011-12 50.0 13.6 15.1 28.7 40.4 71.0% 4.5 11.7 25.3
2012-13 53.0 14.8 15.9 30.7 44.2 69.5% 4.2 13.5 28.3





6.6% 8.8% 4.6% 6.6% 9.5% NA NA 17.9 13.0
Source: AIHW (2010), Treasury (2010a).
Note: The data assumes a constant rate of health infl ation and excludes ‘one-off’ Commonwealth transfers not 
included in forward estimates.
Funding Adequacy
The data (Columns F and G) presented in Table 1 suggest that short term Commonwealth 
contributions to the original NHHN would have met 60% of the forecast cost of funding 
Australia’s public hospital system with a surplus of between $4.5 (2011-12) billion and $3.5 
(2013-14) billion. However this ‘Surplus’ funding pool was modest given the Commonwealth’s 
ambition to increase funding for primary, aged and mental healthcare. To this extent we 
concur with John Deeble’s analysis that the original network would have struggled to maintain 
the funding status quo (Metherell 2010). Clearly the viability of the regime would have been 
critically dependent on ad hoc funding (such as the $7.3 billion ‘top up’ funding from the 
Commonwealth promised in the 2010 Budget (Swan 2010)), and the  undertaking that no 
State would have been made worse off. Of greater signifi cance is the fact the Commonwealth 
funding surplus would have decreased over the period of the Commonwealth forward 
estimates (Column G). This is a consequence of public hospital health infl ation (9.5%) rising 
more quickly than GST revenue growth (6.6%). Under these circumstances the longer term 
fi nancial viability of the regime is dependent on either increasing Commonwealth SPPs to 
the funding network or the NHHN delivering cost savings through reducing hospitalisation 
rates. Whilst there is some evidence that increasing investment in primary care may decrease 
demand for hospital services it is not conclusive (Starfi eld et al 2005). 
This raises the critical question of which level of government would have to manage the 
fi nancial and political risks associated with meeting the potential funding shortfall? Given 
that day-to-day management of Australia’s public hospital would have remained the States’ 
responsibility they would ultimately have been held politically accountable for the quality 
and availability of health services delivered through the public hospital system. Moreover, as 
discussed below, ambiguity surrounding the ‘effi cient price’ for hospital services also posed 
signifi cant fi nancial risks for the States. In summary, inadequate funding combined with the 
fact that citizens hold (and will continue to hold) State Governments accountable for the 
management of public hospitals was likely to perpetuate a situation where the States are the 




Finally, consideration needs to be given to the under-appreciated interaction between the 
fi nancial arrangements central to the NHHN and the Commonwealth Grants Commission 
(CGC) methodology for allocating general revenue assistance to the States (Warren 2010: 
11). Warren argues that unless the CGC methodology is reformed, increasing NHHN funding 
will lead to an automatic reduction in non-GST general revenue assistance effectively 
contradicting the policy intent of the funding.
In summary, this fi nancial analysis suggests that the States (initially just Western Australia) 
were right to resist the original NHHN funding model and propose an alternative regime 
which did not involve the State’s relinquishing up to 30% of their GST revenues. Despite 
limitations in relation to data and policy parameters this analysis suggests that the original 
NHHN model would have done little to address the structural fi nancial problems and 
intergovernmental confl icts that have affl icted Australian health policy in recent years. In 
this context it is critically important to assess whether the reformed health service delivery 
arrangements common to both the NHHN and the Gillard Model are likely to improve the 
effi ciency of Australia’s health system. 
The NHHN’s Impact on the Demand for Health Services 
Australia has a signifi cantly higher rate of hospitalisation than the UK, USA, New Zealand 
and Canada (AIHW 2010). Creating a clear demarcation of roles and responsibilities in the 
health care system should help overall coherence of the system, reduce the political ‘blame 
game’ and mitigate unnecessary demands on public hospitals. When judged against a 
single funder ideal-model, the present reforms fall short; there is no neat separation of the 
Commonwealth as a purchaser of all health care and regulator of quality and States as 
providers of hospital services. Yet even if the single funder is politically infeasible at this 
time, nevertheless from a patient’s point of view, there remains a pressing need to organise 
successful cross-jurisdictional pathways in the system; to not allow governance boundaries 
to inhibit the smooth and effi cient delivery of health care to patients. 
At the organisational level, the challenge of improving the connectedness of the system from 
the patient point of view relies on the relationship between the new Local Hospital Networks 
(LHNs) and Medicare Locals (MLs). However, these new boundaries in the system were 
underspecifi ed in the NHHN and remain so in the Gillard Model, as is their relationship to 
aged care. Although three parts of a new system – local hospitals, local Medicare and aged 
care – remain the foundation of the health care system, how they are to be integrated and 
linked up will be the critical success factor for the implementation of the reform package. 
The problems of organisational planning and partnership working are endemic in the public 
sector; and both reform models lack clarity on this implementation issue. For example, in 
terms of hospitals, it is still uncertain about territorial scale and governance arrangements 
for LHNs and whether these will be coterminous with MLs.
The 2010 Intergenerational Report (Treasury 2010b), as well as an 2009 IMF report, 
preview the extent of the fi scal costs of health and long term care of the population over 
65 confronting Australia: these will increase from 6.5% of GDP up to 12.6% of GDP on 
relatively modest assumptions by 2050 and in Commonwealth budget terms, on current 
policy settings, there will be a substantial redistribution as health increases its share of total 
expenditure from 15% to 26%.  In our view, it is older Australians that face the biggest 
boundaries in the system: those between health, aged and community care. This is the 
sharp end of the cross-jurisdictional, joined-up ambitions of the reform package. There is 
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a pressing requirement for universal case management, especially in relation to complex 
cases and chronic conditions, with its corollary of an effective e-records system as well as 
sustained assistance for the aged care industry. Low-level non-clinical health and social 
care does need greater private and voluntary sector involvement, such as to increase the 
number of places in homes and care facilities.  The link between hospitals and nursing 
homes remains poorly understood and planned; as is the connection, particularly for older 
Australians, between community care services and primary health care services such as 
chronic disease management strategies. The reform package at this design stage lacks 
detail and clarity about how these sorts of governance arrangements will be implemented. 
There is always a difference between the ‘ideal’ system and ‘real’ system. Improving 
connections between different parts of the Australian health care system will require, at 
the clinical ‘coalface’, cross-boundary case management teams and clear, established 
pathways through the system. In turn, this requires genuine devolution of power to the level 
at which health care is actually supplied. In such terms, there was a consensus among 
policy analysts that greater clinician involvement in making decisions about these clinical 
pathways through the system (e.g. outpatient centres and GP links) was highly desirable 
(Kinsman et al 2004, Ovretveit 2010). However, will the implementation of the devolution 
of power to LHNs foreseen in the reform design actually succeed in releasing dynamism 
and innovation in the system to mitigate the adverse infl uence of boundaries?  The role 
of the Commonwealth health minister and State health ministers in the ‘blame game’ is 
critical in realising the benefi cial consequences of decentralisation. From the perspective of 
the contemporary politics of health and experience in other OECD countries, in particular 
where individual cases of mistakes or poor performance gain attention and come to stand 
as representative of the whole, there are grounds for some scepticism about devolution in 
practice (Greener et al 2009).  
 
A proposal to mitigate this problem of health politics would be a formal separation of policy 
and operations at the Commonwealth level. The capacity of LHNs to realise the potential for 
autonomy envisaged in the reform package demands both early leadership from the new 
organisations and a Commonwealth commitment to insulate the operational management 
of LHNs from ministerial interference; this commitment is more credible when it is in solid 
organisational form, for example a separate executive, perhaps with regional offi ces, that 
manages the Commonwealth’s transactions with LHNs. In addition, the Commonwealth will 
need to provide regional support for primary carers, aged care and community care and 
support information linkages throughout the system through e-health initiatives.  
The NHHN’s Impact on the Supply of Health Services
In principle, activity based funding should be good for the public hospital system by 
improving the transparency of the relationship between what is done and what is funded. But 
international experience is that the incentives created by activity-based funding are complex 
and potentially perverse (Siciliani and Hurst 2005).  Implementation diffi culties have been a 
feature of all countries that have introduced national pricing schemes, with schedules having 
to be constantly rebalanced and methods for setting prices regularly revisited. Hospitals do 
not face a single price but rather an extensive menu of prices for different diagnosis-related 
group (DRG) codes, and it is relative prices that will provide incentives for behaviour of the 
system and patients. In such terms, the incentives in performance terms in the Gillard Model 




that service, but what if the national ‘effi cient price’ is lower than the hospital’s cost? Will there 
be transition arrangements until price equals cost or will hospitals be permitted to withdraw 
services that they are unable to provide at the effi cient price? Furthermore, activity-based 
funding is a means of allocating a health budget and does not reveal cost information; therefore 
it may provide inaccurate signals for supply capacity, and both the renewal and maintenance 
of health care capital.  How the prices will be set by the new national Hospital Pricing Authority 
(HPA) will be critical to the supply incentives in the system. For example, if average cost pricing 
rather than marginal cost pricing is adopted, then at the margin, the Commonwealth could 
potentially be funding well over 60% of medical costs, thereby providing incentives to states to 
oversupply certain hospital services. 
In addition, there are two other common problems about case-based funding that have 
occurred internationally.  First, there is the selection problem of incentives to take the easy 
cases, and reduce the harder, more expensive clinical services. Second, national prices by 
DRG code provide low-powered incentives for improving clinical service quality. 
While activity based funding presents some governance advantages in the system by increasing 
transparency and facilitating accountability, it is a moot point whether it will drive effi ciencies 
in hospital service provision to overcome the macro-level fi nancial pressures outlined above. 
The Gillard Model and Its Implications
The Gillard Model, endorsed by COAG in February 2011, links the service delivery reforms 
associated with the original NHHN to a new, simpler funding model. Rather than the 
Commonwealth meeting 60% of the cost of public hospital service delivery in return for up 
to 30% of the States’ and Territories’ GST revenue, the revised model commits Canberra 
to fund 50% of the growth in public hospital costs (Gillard 2011). This matched funding will 
be phased in, increasing from 45% in 2014-15 to eventually covering 50% of the growth in 
hospital costs by 2017-18. The Commonwealth claims this commitment will contribute an 
additional $16.4 billion in extra hospital funding by 2019-20. While, at the time of writing, 
there is insuffi cient detail to evaluate these claims, the Gillard Model is simpler and will 
allow the Commonwealth and the States to share the fi nancial risks associated with health 
cost infl ation more evenly. In contrast, it was likely that the States would have shouldered 
a disproportionate share of this risk under the NHHN. At a micro level there are critical 
aspects of both the NHHN and the Gillard Model that are underspecifi ed. Specifi cally, the 
successful implementation of the Model is critically dependent on clarifying three critical sets 
of relationships within the network structure:
(i) The interrelationships of LHNs, MLs and aged care provision in terms of the 
coherence of the patient experience of the Australian health care system;
(ii) The role of the Commonwealth in promoting decentralised health care decision-
making;
(iii) The role of State governments in the design and implementation of the new LHNs.
If these critical relationships can be adequately specifi ed and managed then despite the 
Commonwealth’s poor historical record, the Gillard Government just may be able to realise 
its ambition of creating a better integrated, effective and fi nancially sustainable national 
health system.
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The Home Insulation Program Policy Debacle: 
Haste Makes Waste
* The author would like to thank John Nethercote, Adjunct Professor at the Australian Catholic University, for his 
encouragement, advice and reading of numerous drafts in regard to this article.
1 This article refers to the Home Insulation Program (HIP) throughout, although this scheme was called the Home 
Owner Insulation Program until September 2009.
2 This included 165 attended by fi re authorities with another 37 confi rmed through roof inspections, although 87 per 
cent of incidents (176 households) did not result in structural damage (DCCEE 2010).
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The Rudd government’s Home Insulation Program (HIP) is widely recognised as a 
signifi cant policy failure. By reference to standard texts on Australian public policy, this 
article argues that the HIP debacle owed much to the government’s determination to 
implement a program speedily without adequate planning or consultation. Although 
the HIP was part of an economic stimulus package to address declining private 
sector activity resulting from the global fi nancial crisis, the program’s effectiveness 
was signifi cantly diminished owing to insuffi cient attention to good public policy 
recommendations that would have enhanced the HIP’s potential success.
One of the greatest policy debacles of the Rudd government was its Home Insulation Program 
(HIP).1 Four deaths occurred before the program was cancelled on 22 April 2010; roughly 
$1 bn of the $2.45 bn spent was, in the end, used to cover the costs of the fl awed scheme, 
including safety and quality inspections for about 200,000 homes fi tted with ceiling batts 
or foil (Berkovic 2010f); and over 200 fi res were caused.2 In July 2010 a Senate committee 
called for a Royal Commission in order “to unravel the gross and systematic failures in the 
development and implementation of the Program” (Senate Committee 2010: ix). Julia Gillard, 
who replaced Kevin Rudd as prime minister on 24 June 2010, stated during the election 
campaign that “the insulation scheme was an absolute mess” (Karvelas and Franklin 2010). 
And the Auditor-General, while acknowledging the program’s role as part of the government’s 
response to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in terms of generating economic stimulus and 
employment (and possible energy effi ciency gains), concluded that “stimulus objective 
overrode risk management practices that should have been expected given the inherent 
program risks”. The Auditor-General stated that the HIP “has been a costly program for 
the outcomes achieved”, that there “still remains a range of safety concerns” with “serious 
inconvenience to many householders”, that reputational damage had been caused to the 
insulation industry, and events had “harmed the reputation of the Australian Public Service for 
effective service delivery” (Auditor-General 2010:26–27).
This article argues that the HIP did not give suffi cient attention to key measures advocated 
by widely used texts on Australian public policy, even allowing for signifi cant differences 
between them. For instance, the Australian Policy Handbook (APH) provides a normative/
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guidelines approach to public policy by illuminating various stages of policy planning and 
implementation (Althaus, et al. 2007). Meanwhile, in Beyond the policy cycle, Hal Colebatch 
(2006:1) cautions that understanding public policy is much more challenging as “the world 
of policy is populated by a range of players with distinct concerns, and that policy-making 
is the intersection of these diverse agendas, not a collective attempt to accomplish some 
known goal”.
Despite important differences between APH and Colebatch, these policy texts share 
commonality in terms of their policy recommendations that would have improved the operation 
of the HIP if upheld. Instead, as this article will highlight, the HIP proved a debacle on three 
counts. First, in terms of leadership, the Rudd government’s determination to implement a 
policy speedily undermined any chance of formulating a more balanced and effective policy 
approach while also placing immense pressure on those responsible for implementation, 
the Commonwealth’s Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts (DEWHA) 
and State/Territory governments. Second, the government downplayed the importance of 
consultation, a crucial dimension to the HIP given that various safety and training concerns 
were expressed by a variety of industry players. Third, there is the art of judgment; the 
government did not display common sense in regard to the HIP in understanding likely 
participant and consumer behaviour regarding substantial fraud and rorts.  
The role of government leadership
As with any public program, the quality of ministerial leadership is crucial to success. In 
this regard, the APH and Colebatch approaches are in agreement; they both accept the 
infl uence of powerful ministers and departments. As Scott Prasser (2006:26–9) observes in a 
chapter for Colebatch’s Beyond the Policy Cycle, “the public bureaucracy is now expected to 
be more responsive to the demands of elected governments and their policy agendas”.  APH 
also states that “the policy domain speaks through the heads of central agencies such as 
Prime Minister and Cabinet (PMC), the Department of Finance and Administration (Finance) 
and Treasury, though policy itself is typically developed within the relevant policy department. 
The central agencies also speak for the fi nal domain, administration” (Althaus, Bridgman and 
Davis 2007:26).
As the Rudd government demonstrated with the HIP, speedy implementation was the 
major goal rather than a policy that was supported by all involved participants. It has been 
documented that DEWHA had earlier favoured a fi ve-year roll-out out in order to deliver the HIP 
given its nature and size, yet the government wanted a two and a half year roll-out (Auditor-
General 2010:69). The government’s decision, approving the HIP as part of its $42 bn Nation 
Building and Jobs Plan (Rudd 2009a&b), followed Treasury’s advice that a stimulus package 
was necessary to counter the likely impact of the GFC in 2010–11 (SERC 2009:E3–E4). 
The government promoted large-scale participation as quickly as possible. The HIP included 
a rebate of $1600 for householders (intended to run until 31 December 2011); Medicare 
was responsible for online registration and payment to installers where approved by DEWHA 
(Auditor-General 2010:49). According to DEWHA, the $1600 rebate was designed “to 
achieve maximum impact in line with the economic stimulus and employment objectives 
of the program” (DEWHA Submission 19:14). The Insulation Council of Australia and New 
Zealand (ICANZ), in 2007, estimated that an average home would cost from $1200 to $1500 




a 28 per cent uptake over three years (ICANZ Submission 18:11; D’Arcy 2010:72; Deloitte 
Insight Economics 2007: 6). 
To manage risk, DEWHA did follow part of the policy framework suggested by APH by 
commissioning  Minter Ellison to undertake a Risk Register and Management Plan in March 
2009. Completed in April 2009, and publicly released in February 2010, the Risk Register 
listed 19 individual risks. These included an extremely limited time frame (by 1 July 2009); 
inadequate regulation to prevent fraudulent or inappropriate behaviour; inadequate training; 
and quality issues (Minter Ellison 2009:1).  
However, this advice was not heeded.  Although Minter Ellison urged the initial rebate scheme 
be extended to 30 September 2009 instead of operating to 30 June 2009 with householders 
continuing to pay the installer and then claiming a $1600 reimbursement (Minter Ellison 
2009:1), DEWHA decided not to defer on the basis it had addressed the risks identifi ed 
(Forbes 2010:61). From 1 July 2009, if the contracted price was less than the $1600 rebate 
limit householders paid nothing for insulation. Installers were paid directly through Medicare’s 
claim processing system (Senate Committee 2010:10). Further, under the Risk Register and 
Management Plan, fraud risk was transferred from the Commonwealth to providers where 
possible; installers were required to be insured properly and indemnify the Commonwealth 
against claims/loss arising from installers’ actions (Minter Ellison 2009:1).
Such measures reinforced the government’s determination to implement the HIP with minimal 
delay. As one document reveals, the Nation Building and Jobs Plan was overseen by the 
Commonwealth Coordinator General (then within Department of PMC), whose purpose was 
to “break red tape and get work happening on the ground as quickly as possible” (Nation 
Building Economic Stimulus Plan 2009:12). Michael Mrdak (2010:10, former Coordinator 
General, has stated that “the Government had clearly set out a very ambitious program for 
the rollout of a number of these infrastructure initiatives… The time frames were set out in the 
National Partnership Agreement, which was agreed by COAG. There certainly was a strong 
view by government and by senior offi cials that we should continue to press on to meet the 
time frames that had been set out by the government”. At an industry consultation on 18 
February 2009, a representative of the Offi ce of the Coordinator General informed the meeting 
that “$2.7 billion worth of funding is in part structured around the Government going into defi cit 
for a short period of time. Clear statements from Treasurer and the Prime Minister required that 
funding be spent within 2.5 years with a cap of $1600 per household” (ICANZ 2010).
The government’s determination to implement the HIP speedily was made despite 
signifi cant concern being expressed by various State governments. South Australia’s Co-
ordinator-General, Rod Hook, told his Commonwealth counterpart, Michael Mrdak, that he 
had concerns about the program “from day one in February 2009”. Hook told the ABC of 
concerns about safety and how the Commonwealth “was going to audit the program to 
ensure it was getting value for money and proper installation” (Berkovic 2010c). According 
to Western Australia’s then-Treasurer, Troy Buswell, DEWHA offi cials told offi cers of State 
consumer agencies via a phone hook-up during April 2009 that a 10 per cent failure rate was 
to be expected3 (Tillett, Probyn and Taylor 2010). The ABC (and other sources) reveal that 
DEWHA offi cials, during April 2009, told state and territory offi cials that the extensive rollout 
of insulation posed a risk to lives and property, and that the program would effectively be 
unregulated (Hudson 2010a; Berkovic and OBrien 2010; Editorial 2010c). 
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State offi cials were concerned that the Commonwealth had not mandated qualifi cations for 
insulation installers; had no criteria for companies being listed on a Federal register of installers; 
and that being on the register would be seen by consumers as government endorsement. 
State offi cials were also not impressed with the prospect of being responsible for any accident, 
death or blaze caused by the program (Probyn and Tillett 2010). The NSW government was 
so alarmed by the HIP just a month after it started that it wanted the Commonwealth to 
pay to have 10 per cent of work inspected. This was revealed by previously confi dential 
documents (obtained under Freedom of Information) sent to Environment Minister Peter 
Garrett in September 2009 because of concern about “a spike in the number of house fi res” 
linked to the HIP (Farr 2010). 
The Rudd government’s approach to the HIP was very much top-down; DEWHA and other 
levels of government were expected to fall in line. As revealed by an anonymous insider 
from DEWHA on ABC TV’s Four Corners (April 2010), “we were told many times by senior 
management that the technical and safety issues were of less importance than getting this 
programme up and running and creating jobs” (Carlisle 2010).
 
Consultation
The Rudd government’s determination to implement the HIP speedily raises the question of 
whether adequate consultation was carried out with various key industry players.
Both APH and Colebatch emphasise the importance of consultation and APH notes the 
problem “of how to weight differing voices” (Althaus et al. 2007:98). The APH makes a number 
of points. First, consultation provides “an opportunity for policy makers to invite and obtain 
stakeholder input into the calculation of whether any particular policy is feasible” (Althaus 
et al. 2007:98). Second, consultation serves “to improve the quality of policy decisions 
through access to relevant information and perspectives, including exchange of problem and 
solution defi nitions, alternatives and criteria”. Third, consultation promotes “understanding, 
acceptance and legitimacy of proposed policies” and “promotes consensus about policy 
choices … by providing transparency, accountability and opportunities for participation 
(Althaus et al. 2007: 119-120). Fourth, consultation boosts a policy’s feasibility by improving 
“the confi dence of decision makers that a policy is not going to be riddled with embarrassing 
problems even before it commences the implementation phase” (Althaus et al. 2007: 98). 
Similarly, Prasser (2006:273–74) notes that:  
every policy issue has its own particular group of interests, so one of the tests of good 
politics and good policy is that there is overall support for any new proposal from 
these groups. The range of interest groups will vary from issue to issue, and across 
different policy areas. The task is to recognise what groups are important and to 
gauge their infl uence and power. This will partly depend on the party in power.
The reality is that the HIP applied to an industry where the need for extensive consultation 
was essential if only for the high safety risks. While it has been noted that the home insulation 
industry previously had few special regulations, besides being “subject to normal work 
and safety provisions and employers’ duty of care”, with insulation “frequently installed by 
householders themselves” (Tiffen 2010), greater attention to consultation should have been 
a given because the insulation of Australian homes was moving from the previous historical 




Submission 18: 6; Combet 2010a:2149–51). Further, any malpractice within the insulation 
industry was likely to multiply owing to the likelihood that the number of installer companies 
would increase substantially from an estimated 200 established businesses installing 
insulation prior to the HIP (Auditor-General 2010:65–66).
The DEWHA did not consult widely with the electrical industry during the design stage of 
HIP, even allowing for the restricted timeframe for implementation. As the Auditor-General 
(2010:67) noted, “consultation would most likely have enhanced the department’s awareness 
of safety issues indicated”.
The safeguards that were introduced proved inadequate, as was predicted by many industry 
groups. From 1 July 2009, installer businesses were required to be registered with DEWHA, 
have occupational health and safety training, and comply with relevant Australian Standards for 
insulation materials and installation (Installer Advice No. 9 and No. 12). There was mandatory 
minimum occupational health and safety training for all personnel involved in installation; 
installers had to comply with State/Territory workplace and occupational health and safety 
laws; and installation practices were governed by relevant Australian Standards and State/
Territory regulations for laying thermal insulation and working around electrical wiring (DEWHA 
Submission 19:5, 26). The Construction and Property Services Industry Skills Council also 
produced a range of training resources for Registered Training Providers; including a “pocket 
book” for installers available from 1 August 2009 which contained information about common 
installation hazards including electrical hazards (CPSISC 2009:2).  
While the Auditor-General has suggested that “strong and divergent views among 
stakeholders made it diffi cult for DEWHA to make a judgement on how stringent to make 
the terms and conditions” (Auditor-General 2010: 77), there is considerable evidence that 
important concerns from a variety of industry players were virtually ignored. 
There had been, with substantial justifi cation, extensive concern about electrical safety prior 
to its implementation, even though the Insulation Council of Australia and New Zealand 
(ICANZ) argued that it did not support compulsory electrical inspections on the basis that 
“experienced insulation installers know what to do and have managed this safely over the 
years” (ICANZ, Submission 18:17). Master Electricians Australia (MEA) expressed concern 
about inadequate training given the various electrical risks. These included pre-existing faults 
in wiring in the roof space, and faulty installation of aluminium foil because it is a conductor of 
electricity (MEA 2009:3; Garrett 2010a). 
On 18 May 2009, the MEA warned about “a very serious fi re risk” being caused by the 
incorrect installation of woollen batts, “especially in older homes” (MEA 2009:3). The National 
Electrical and Communications Association (NECA), having stated in February 2009 that 
“there is a signifi cant risk of electrical equipment overheating especially in the event of 
downlights in ceilings being covered if insulation is installed inappropriately”, recommended 
that a licensed electrician check wiring before installation (NECA 2009; Bostrom 2010:53–4). 
NECA’s chief executive, James Tinslay, wrote to the Minister, Peter Garrett (9 March) about 
the “inherent dangers” of installing insulation near electrical cables in regards to fi res and 
the need to train installers (NECA 2009; Hudson 2010a; Berkovic and OBrien 2010), while 
also stressing that there were “inherent dangers” with foil insulation (Balogh, Pierce & Hintz 
2010). The National Secretary of the Electrical Trades Union, Peter Tighe, reported that his 
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union raised concerns about poor electrical safety aspects early in 2009 during discussions 
with a departmental advisory group reporting to Garrett; “they ignored our advice and gave 
the impression they thought our concerns were excessive” (Editorial 2010b). The government 
also ignored knowledge that plastic staples had been recommended in New Zealand since 
2007 (NZMED 2007); ICANZ also noted on 18 February 2009 that a similar program in New 
Zealand “had to be suspended because three people electrocuted themselves” (ICANZ 2010). 
Concerning training, Dave Noonan, National Secretary of the Construction Forestry Mining 
and Energy Union (CFMEU), reported that the union: 
expressed concerns about the poor level of training right from the start on the basis 
that there are risks involved in this sort of work ... We made it very clear that people 
working in this program would need to be trained to identify potential electrical risks 
and they’d need to be aware of the risks involved in working at heights and in confi ned 
spaces ... We also made it clear this program would attract young, vulnerable workers 
with no experience in the construction industry. We said they’d also need proper 
training regarding unsafe work practices and their right to refuse to work in an unsafe 
environment (Beeby 2010a). 
The CFMEU was so concerned about inadequate funding for training installers under the 
program that, with the exception of NSW, its registered training organisations throughout 
Australia refused to participate in the program. Assistant national secretary, Lindsay Fraser, a 
member of the technical working group appointed in 2009 to advise the government on job 
opportunities and training, stated that “they were not prepared to fund the training to the level 
we argued was necessary” (Beeby 2010c). 
With the deaths of installers, the Rudd government adopted tougher requirements. From 2 
November 2009, after the death of the fi rst installer on 19 October 2009, metal fasteners were 
banned; plastic staples were made compulsory. It also became mandatory for installation of 
covers to be placed over downlights and other ceiling appliances, and an electrical safety 
inspection program was announced for foil installations in Queensland (Garrett 2009a). 
It was only on 17 December 2009, following the third insulation-related death, that the 
government announced that training requirements now applied beyond supervisors to all 
employees involved in installation, although this was only to take effect from 12 February 
2010 (Garrett 2009b&c). Any company unable to provide proof of training of one of the three 
competency criteria by their workers would be suspended (Rehn 2010; Auditor-General 2010: 
108). As of February 2010, only 2,738 or 37 per cent of registered installers could provide 
evidence of minimum competency requirements; the Auditor-General has suggested that 
this low fi gure may be explained by higher costs of compliance with the new requirements 
(Auditor-General 2010:108).
After the fourth insulation-related death during February 2010, the government suspended 
the use of foil insulation from the HIP (9 February 2010) because of concerns about electrical 
safety where foil was not properly installed (Editorial 2010a), with the HIP Program closed on 
19 February 2010 for safety and compliance reasons (Garrett 2010b). The HIP was ultimately 
axed on 22 April 2010 after the government received a report by Dr Allan Hawke (6 April 
2010) which expressed “grave concerns about the wisdom of proceeding” and “safety and 




As for potential industry benefi ts, Brian Tikey, representing the Aluminium Foil Insulation 
Association (AFIA), wrote to Prime Minister Rudd in February 2009 about the rebate. Tikey 
argued that the subsidy would open the door to a fl ood of cheap fi breglass imports and do 
little to benefi t Australian manufacturers. Neither Rudd nor Garrett replied; nor was there 
any departmental acknowledgement that the letter had been received or considered (Beeby 
2010b). Although ICANZ predicted that any reliance on imports would be minimal (ICANZ 
2010), AFIA also warned the government (February 2009) that “cheap imports” would not 
meet Australian standards or be “compliant to the Building Code of Australia” (AFIA 2009:2). 
In time, the Polyester Insulation Manufacturers Association of Australia (PIMAA), although 
not only focusing on imports, claimed that 30 to 40 per cent of homes used non-compliant 
products (Zuzul 2010:10), a claim which ICANZ strongly disputed (Thompson 2010:58). 
Although ICANZ estimated that only about 8 per cent of HIP materials were Chinese, 
about 40 per cent of the Chinese materials (about 3 per cent of the HIP total) failed thermal 
claims (ICANZ 2010; Thompson 2010:58). PIMAA also felt compelled to warn Garrett about 
excessive levels of formaldehyde from imports, a substance (although not specifi cally banned) 
which has been linked to respiratory problems and cancer (Hudson 2010b). At the Senate 
inquiry, DEWHA noted that any complaint by householders about non-compliant materials 
was a matter for State/Territory fair trading authorities (DEWHA Submission 19:30). 
The Art of Judgment  
The Rudd government’s determination to implement the HIP speedily, and downplay many 
warnings from a variety of those involved during the consultation stage, also begs the 
question about its capacity for sound judgement. 
The need for careful judgment is recognised by both APH and Colebatch.  APH notes that “it 
is diffi cult to test behavioural assumptions before a policy is implemented”. APH emphasises 
the need for careful judgment given that “policies must make assumptions about behaviour” 
with “incentives that encourage one behaviour over another, or disincentives to encourage 
particular actions”, and “must incorporate guesses about take-up and commitment, and 
mechanisms to deal with shirking and encourage compliance” (Althaus et al. 2007:7). 
Colebatch observes that “policy does not exist in a vacuum, but in relation to some identifi ed 
fi eld of practice, and this implies knowledge, both of the problem area and of the things that 
might be done about it” (Colebatch 2002:10).
To some degree, the Auditor-General softens its criticism of DEWHA by suggesting that the 
HIP proved “more complex than anticipated”, with risk treatment options proving inadequate 
over time “to manage the emerging risks” (Auditor-General 2010:76). The report suggests 
that “there may have been a perception by householders that installers who were listed 
on the register had gone through a more stringent registration process than agreeing to 
the terms of conditions of registration and an Australian Business Number validation check, 
which was all that was required until 1 September 2009”, a period which involved 70 per cent 
of registrations. It was only from 1 September 2009 that all new installers were required “to 
provide copies of OH&S certifi cates for all installers associated with their business, verifi cation 
of public liability and property damage insurance, verifi cation of workers’ compensation 
insurance (where applicable) and evidence of competency for those installers in a supervisory 
role” (Auditor-General 2010:105)
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The HIP debacle reinforces a reality that should always be present in policy-making. This is the 
need to take account of human nature, to understand that all action occurs in an imperfect 
world. This is not a new insight. The Federalist Papers, for example, warn that “if men were 
angels, no government would be necessary”. And, further, “if angels were to govern men, 
neither external controls nor government would be necessary” (Madison, Hamilton and Jay 
1788:319–20). 
Realistic appraisal of the HIP based on what could go wrong would have told ministers 
and administrators that the program would be open to abuse. The scale of the funding 
warranted an active obligation to minimise risk; it should certainly not have been assumed 
that all installer companies would do the right thing. 
The government’s haste to implement the HIP (and promote extensive take up) overrode 
other sensible approaches that placed a greater burden on the purchaser and helped to 
minimise rorting. Until 30 June 2009, two independent quotes along with a site inspection 
(with exemptions for remote areas) were required. It was naïve to remove this requirement 
on 1 July “to allow the market and householders to interact without the involvement of the 
department” (DEWHA, Submission 19:8, 15; HIP 2009:5). Nor was it sensible to place 
the burden on the consumer to choose a suitable installer and insulation type, enter into a 
contract with the installer, and express satisfaction with the work by signing a Work Order 
Form to enable the installer to be paid through the online payment system (Senate Committee 
2010:10). 
The likelihood that the HIP would be rorted should have been evident from the start, long 
before the Hawke Report (April 2010) recognised that “the lack of an upfront payment and no 
requirement for quotes (between June and November 2009) meant there was little incentive 
for householders to take the normal level of responsibility for the quality and performance of 
the installers” (Hawke 2010:29). As two submissions to the Senate committee noted, paying 
the fi rst 25 per cent of the cost of insulation would have encouraged rational decision making 
behaviour by consumers and some “buy-in” from them in the outcome (PIMAA 2009:6; Autex 
Submission 10:6). One Sydney builder, who had been fi tting home insulation for fi ve years 
before the scheme began, commented that, once the government announced the money, 
the insulation market was like a spaghetti western movie; “there were so many cowboys out 
there”. “People who had no experience were being hired to do the work and everybody was 
billing for the total amount of the grant rather than what the job actually cost. It was a giant 
rort and nobody in authority seemed to care” (Reilly 2010). Similarly, John Muldoon, who 
has been working in the solar power industry for more than a quarter of a century, said such 
rebate schemes attracted “shoddy operators and shoddy work” because “whenever you give 
a signifi cant rebate you attract the wrong people into the industry” whether it be “rainwater 
tanks, insulation, solar … there is a common theme, people come into the industry because 
they think there is a quick buck to be made” (Chalmers and Elsworth 2010).
While the government may have underestimated the possible increase in insulation installer 
companies (from around 200 companies to 6313 by 6 December 2009 (DEWHA Submission 
19:21–23), it should have done much more to minimise the likelihood of  dodgy businesses 
being established to take advantage of the program. After all, the government’s requirements 
for installers to be registered with DEWHA from July 2009 allowed qualifi cation by three options: 




competency by either a statement of attainment from a Registered Training Organisation or 
Training Package relating to insulation installation; or c) through two years of work experience 
installing insulation (Installer Advice No. 9). It was only mandatory for the supervisor to have 
insulation-specifi c competencies (DEWHA 2009; Auditor-General 2010:107). 
One company, Sky green, noted that a supervisor could have a large crew of untrained 
people performing the installations and simply arrive at each installation to sign off on the 
form (Sky green 2009:10). Not only did new installation businesses emerge from businesses 
such as pest controllers, gyprock installers and pool and spa companies (Berkovic 2009), 
even convicted criminals were able to benefi t from the HIP because of minimal checks on 
those receiving public money. One person accessed taxpayer funds for 10 months despite 
previously serving seven years in prison from 2000 for eight violent crimes, including 
conspiracy to murder, false imprisonment, four counts of sexual assault without consent, and 
maliciously wounding a person with intent to infl ict grievous bodily harm and an attempt to 
cause contraction of a grievous body disease (Berkovic 2010b). Another convicted arsonist 
(2002) who had previously torched a kebab shop for insurance money was director of a 
company which installed government-subsidised roof insulation until deregistered during 
February 2010 after causing a house fi re through insulation placed over the downlights in a 
roof (Wilson 2010).
With few checks on the rebate scheme, and the rebate only reduced from $1600 to $1200 
from 2 November 2009 (Garrett 2009a),4 the number of HIP installations exploded after 
July 2009 once costs for consumers were basically eliminated with no upfront payment, 
particularly in months when the rebate amount was reduced or the program suspended 
(November 2009 and February 2010).5
In contrast to APH’s observations about judgment, the government implemented few 
measures to encourage consumers to adopt their own checks to enhance quality and value 
for money by paying some of the fee, a reality that encouraged a climate signifi cantly amenable 
to fraud and/or poor quality, along with much waste of the public purse. While DEWHA 
noted that only 0.65 per cent of participants complained about their experience (Thompson 
2010:24), the Australia Institute found that, among householders approached by insulation 
businesses in the previous 12 months, 16 per cent were told that insulation needs to be 
replaced regularly — misinformation highlighting attempts to defraud the Commonwealth 
(Australia Institute, Submission 46:2–3).
It took months of adverse media publicity before the government acted, notwithstanding 
compelling evidence about the abuse of HIP. In June 2009, the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission announced that it was already investigating reports that the 
necessary second quote could be obtained by telephone or from a subcontractor, without 
visiting the house, and that one insulation company had “partnered” another company to 
provide the necessary quotes (Maley 2009). 
4 However, installers could continue to claim up to $1600 until 30 November 2009 if four criteria were met: that the 
quote for installation had been accepted by the householder prior to 2 November 2009; installation was completed 
between 2 November and 16 November 2009; online component of the claim was lodged by the installer prior to 
the manual component; and online and manual components of the claim were lodged prior to 30 November 2009 
(Auditor-General 2010: 121-122).
5 HIP installation fi gures for 2009 were: March 3,321; April 7,917; May 18,175; June 23,642; July 78,375; August 
108,169; September 136,838; October 165,104; November 209,267; and December 136,402. For 2010: January 
139,850; and February 186,095 (Senate Committee 2010: 19).
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Yet, it was only from December 2009 that new mandatory risk assessment was required for 
each job before work started, which included fi lling in a form to prompt the installer to look 
for the listed hazards, and giving advice about how to respond to them (Garrett 2009c). New 
guidelines also required two independent quotes and a site inspection (with exemptions for 
remote areas) (DEWHA Submission 19:8, 15); while installers attempting to access grant/s 
were now subject to “stringent” Australian Business Number and background checks (Vasek 
2009). 
Common sense should have also prevailed regarding the possibility that new installer 
businesses, without adequate safety training, would provide a much greater risk to the public 
and help undermine long-established successful businesses. This is despite the Auditor-
General suggesting that “learning on the job and allowing qualifi ed and experienced individuals 
to supervise the work of inexperienced trainees is an acceptable practice within the general 
construction industry”. The Auditor-General also acknowledged that “installing insulation, which 
requires working in a roof space (particularly near electrical wiring), is hazardous and presented 
a high level of risk for inexperienced and untrained workers” (Auditor-General 2010: 107).
As the Master Electricians Association noted in its submission to the Senate committee, 
its more than 70 years experience representing the electrical contracting industry showed 
clearly that unskilled labour combined with electrical cabling was a recipe for tragedy (MEA 
2009:3). Several organisations noted that foil had been used safely for 50 years, and that 
recent fatalities were caused by the infl ux of inexperienced workers (AMI 2010:2; Tikey 
2010:78; Renouf 2010:78). With foil better suited to Queensland’s climate than fi breglass, 
Silverline Insulation founder Peter Venn, who employs 25 people in Queensland and had 
been installing foil insulation for 23 years and had never had an accident, noted that the 
government had “rushed ahead and allowed every unqualifi ed person to come into the 
industry, that’s what happens” (Berkovic 2010a). AFIA’s vice-president Michel Bostrom also 
argued again that “in 54 years since the fi rst roll of foil was sold in Australia … there has not 
been, to my knowledge, a single case of electrocution installing foil until now” (Maiden 2010). 
Some 100,000 Queensland homes had been fi tted with foil during the past 30 years without 
any electrical safety issues (Berkovic 2010d).
Others noted how installers in the past had always relied on staff learning how to
work safely on the job (AMI 2010:2); that most in the insulation industry would not have 
allowed installers to go out after only having been on a two-day course (Arblaster 2010:21); 
that brief formal training – six hours to two days — could not adequately replace supervised 
experience or surpass a stipulation that at least one person in a roof should be either a 
tradesperson or someone with at least six months experience in the industry (Bostrom 2010); 
that training up to October 2009 was scant to non-existent for most installers, with many 
new entrants having little experience (MEA 2009:3); and that exemptions from competency 
requirements defi ed logic as a “free pass” to a number of trades was problematic given 
limited direct dealings with insulation” (AFIA 2009:6).
Evaluation and lessons learned 
Following APH, there is a need to evaluate a policy or program to draw lessons from the HIP 
debacle.  
While it was hoped that the HIP would insulate a further 2.7 million homes (Auditor-General 




(Auditor-General 2010:26). It has already been noted that about $1 billion, approximately 40 
per cent of the $2.45 billion cancelled scheme, will be needed to cover the costs of the HIP 
(although any surplus amount would be returned to the budget), including safety and quality 
inspections of about 200,000 homes fi tted with ceiling batts or foil. This included $424 million 
for the Foil Insulation Safety Program and Home Insulation Safety Program, and $56 million for 
various industry assistance packages (Auditor-General 2010: 26). 
Substantial rectifi cation of completed work was needed. As of March 2010, of 13,808 roof 
inspections conducted, around 29 per cent had identifi ed installations “with some level of 
defi ciency, ranging from minor quality issues to serious safety concerns” (Auditor-General 
2010:26). By 25 July 2010, 489 homes had foil insulation removed (Auditor-General 2010:99).
There were a signifi cant number of complaints. While the 11,874 complaints represented less 
than 1 per cent of total installations, there were 2,883 instances of no insulation being installed; 
1,348 concerns about fi re or safety risks; and 193 complaints of work order forms being 
signed but no installation done. There were also 1,051 complaints about incomplete work; 
1,317 towards questionable installer practices; 375 property damage; 222 overcharging; 
292 installing without consent; and 150 for using non-compliant material (Auditor-General 
2010:90–91).
There was some benefi t in terms of employment, although the actual number of jobs created 
from the HIP was “not monitored or reported against in any disciplined way” (Auditor-General 
2010:37). While DEWHA estimates that an additional 6,000 to 10,000 new jobs were created 
by the end of 2009 (Auditor-General 2010:37), Fletcher, a company producing about 40 per 
cent of Australia’s insulation, estimating during July 2010 that 8000 jobs would be lost from 
the industry (Rolfe 2010). It is highly probable that a more gradual expansion of the HIP could 
have sustained a steady increase of employment over a longer time frame, albeit that initial job 
creation would have been lower.
More gradual take-up of the HIP would also have helped domestic insulation batts production 
keep up with demand with much less dependence upon imports, despite DEWHA noting that 
Australia’s World Trade Organization free trade obligations prevented restrictions on imports 
(Kruk 2010:26). While it is diffi cult to know precisely how much material was imported as 
statistics do not separate glasswool batts from total fi breglass products (DEWHA, Submission 
19:21), ICANZ estimated that about 40 per cent of HIP installations used imported products 
from China, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), Malaysia and Thailand (ICANZ 2010). 
The HIP disaster also led to costly business decisions. One company, projecting increased 
demand for fi re retardant downlight barriers, increased production from 500 units a day to 
5000 a day, while taking on more staff and installing more equipment. When the HIP was axed, 
the owner was left with $65,000 worth of unsold stock and forced to lay off staff (Lower 2010).
It is diffi cult to calculate energy effi ciency and greenhouse benefi ts obtained by the HIP.It 
had been estimated “that, on average, for each home that received new ceiling insulation, 
1.65 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2-e) will be saved each year”, equating 
to an estimated 1.9 million tonnes of CO2-e per annum nationally based on 1.16 million 
installations (0.4 per cent of Australia’s annual national greenhouse gas emissions in 2007 
(Auditor-General 2010:37, 100). According to the Auditor-General, this assumption cannot 
be determined with any accuracy given “problems with installation quality, the removal of 
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insulation where safety risks were a problem, and potentially fraudulently claimed installations 
(Auditor-General 2010:37, 100)
The jury is still out on the fi nal extent of suffering and waste. On fi res, the Senate committee’s 
fi nal report concluded that “it is impossible to say whether the rate of defective-installation-
causing-fi re is higher or lower in HIP jobs than in earlier jobs” (Senate Committee 2010:56). 
The Committee cited other information that suggested it would require knowledge of the 
average “incubation period” of an insulation-related fi re (Senate Committee 2010:56; ICANZ 
Submission 18:6; Combet 2010a:2151). One source, comparing ABS data for 2008 with 
fi res under the HIP to February 2010, noted that there had been 80–85 fi res per year before 
the HIP in regard to an average 67,500 per year, compared to 93 fi res under the HIP by 
February 2010 from about 1.1 million installations (Possum Comitatus 2010). Other data 
were less supportive. By 17 March 2010, the eighteenth fi re in the Melbourne metropolitan 
area occurred in relation to insulation in 2010. There had been seven such fi res from January 
to June 2009 and 31 from July to December 2009 (Webb 2010). 
In terms of deaths, more adequate training may have prevented the four deaths —although 
the construction industry had an average of 35 fatalities a year in Australia despite high 
OH&S standards and severe penalties for non-compliance (CPSISC 2009:2). When more 
adequate training was made compulsory for all installers from 12 February 2010, with 7,300 
insulation fi rms having to re-register under new rules (Bita 2010), little more than one-third of 
businesses met the training standards (Berkovic 2010e).
The four deaths resulting from the HIP have led to legal action. One Queensland company 
(Arrow Property Maintenance Pty Ltd) pleaded guilty to safety breaches following the 
electrocution of Reuben Barnes, 16 years old, while installing fi breglass insulation in central 
Queensland, on November 18, 2009. Though the Rockhampton Industrial Magistrates Court 
heard that there was no “specifi c or documented procedures in place for installation of 
insulation”, the company had allowed work to proceed without the house’s electricity being 
turned off and had not provided workers with fi rst aid training in the event of electric shock 
and offer proper induction training (AAP 2010).
There was also abuse of workers in regards to wages. While the Auditor-General noted just 
13 complaints from staff about not being paid (Auditor-General 2010:91), an audit by the Fair 
Work Ombudsman of more than 200 companies (mostly in Queensland) since April 2010 
found that 58 businesses had underpaid their workers following complaints from unions and 
workers. Hence, seventy-nine workers were repaid nearly $50,000 (Barry 2010). 
In terms of fraud, by April 2010 there were 961 cases where more than one insulator had 
submitted a claim for payment for insulating the same premises, all of which were referred for 
further investigation (Medicare Australia 2010). 
So what can be learned from the HIP experience? Certainly the Rudd government should 
have taken advice from DEWHA offi cials who urged a much slower roll out of the HIP over fi ve 
years or more, in line with industry warnings (Berkovic 2010d; Auditor-General 2010:69). While 
a slower rollout would have reduced the HIP’s contribution to the government’s economic 
stimulus package to counter the GFC, the government may have learned more from the 




budgeted for $1.2 million for 3000 rebates; provided a rebate of 30 per cent (up to $300) 
for non-concession card holders and 50 per cent (up to $500) for concession card holders. 
Further, in contrast to the HIP, all installers in the Victorian scheme were required to sign a 
contract specifying their obligations and complete a six-hour training session conducted by a 
technical college; participating companies had prior experience in insulation installation; and 
5 to 10 per cent of each installer’s work was audited for safety and quality by an experienced 
building inspection company (Auditor-General 2010:53). 
Both the Warm Front (UK) and Warm Up (NZ) schemes, started in 2000 and 2009 respectively, 
also had “extensive checks on installers prior to registration, including safety practices, 
reliability, quality of work, experience, price, service and fi nancial position; outsourced delivery 
models that used companies with experience in the insulation or energy effi ciency industries; 
fi ve to 10 per cent of insulation installations audited for quality; and longer delivery timeframes 
and were of a smaller scale” (Auditor-General 2010:53).
The Auditor-General’s report contains a number of recommendations. First, DEWHA, 
supported by Medicare, could have collected information from installers as part of a better 
process for claims, compliance and audit to develop risk profi les of installers to “better detect 
and address instances of serious non-compliance and potential fraud” (Auditor-General 
2010: 35). Second, although just 0.7 per cent of de-registrations were due to installer non-
compliance with program terms and conditions which were agreed at the time of registration 
(Auditor-General 2010:35), and conceding that any de-registration process incorporate 
“principles of natural justice”, the de-registration process was far too long (Auditor-General 
2010: 132). With the fi rst installer de-registered for non-compliance on 6 October 2009, and 
the fi rst payment withheld in late August 2009, such penalties did not occur until months 
after the HIP began (Auditor-General 2010:135). One installer, referred to the compliance 
committee on 7 October 2009, was not de-registered until 21 December 2009; another, 
fi rst discussed by the compliance committee in regard to fraud on 12 November 2009, was 
not de-registered until 15 January 2010. During HIP, six installers were discovered to have 
duplicate registrations with cases of installers being able to operate after being de-registered 
for non-compliance (Auditor-General 2010:148).
Other recommendations urged a more appropriate time-frame in terms of diminishing risk 
and ensuring best outcomes; quicker advice and options given to ministers about possible 
policy constraints during implementation; responsible departments having “in-depth 
knowledge of the industry or business environment”; more thorough consultation with key 
players about relevant issues; a greater understanding of what effect a policy will have on the 
behaviour of industry and consumers; measures to encourage “the right incentive structures 
for participants” (such as withholding a proportion of payments or requiring co-payment from 
those benefi ting); governance arrangements that clearly defi ne roles and responsibilities to 
encourage “appropriate mobilisation of resources and addressing emerging problems in a 
timely and effective manner”; and appropriate levels of skilled staff and resources to support 
policy implementation (Auditor-General 2010: 173-176).
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Conclusion
The HIP is a signifi cant case study demonstrating what can happen when best practice public 
policy recommendations are only given scant attention. Despite differences between key 
public policy texts such as APH and Colebatch, as illustrated above, the Rudd government’s 
HIP would have been enhanced had more attention been given to known standards of public 
policy making. 
The HIP confi rms the worst fears held by both APH and Colebatch. The government did not 
give adequate attention to serious safety and quality concerns. APH, in this respect, warns 
that “consulting may just be cherry-picking acceptable responses” (Althaus et al. 2007:105), 
and Colebatch observes that the consultation stage is often swamped by the reality that 
participation can remain “a powerful rhetorical theme in policy practice” (Colebatch 2006:5–
6). APH notes that “creative thinking and high level skills are needed to resolve the tensions 
in practice” (Althaus et al. 2007:105); this expectation was misplaced where the HIP was 
concerned.
In the end, while the Rudd government implemented the HIP in order to offset predicted 
lower private sector economic activity caused by the GFC, the failure of the program was 
derived from its determination to implement the HIP speedily; the lack of consultation with 
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This paper questions the common view that in the past half-century Australian women 
have radically changed their focus from unpaid domestic work to employed work. 
The common view is largely based on labour force participation rates. These rates 
give a deceptive picture. Actual work activity has to be tracked using fi gures on hours 
worked. This paper presents two sets of hourly fi gures from the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS), one set dating back to 1966, the other back to 1987. Neither 
suggests a dramatic change in women’s actual work activity.
It has come to be almost universally regarded as an indisputable fact that women are moving 
out of the home and into the workforce. Economist Graeme Snooks sees it in this way:
One of the central events of this period [Australia, 1940–1990] was the rush of female 
household workers to join the market workforce. This phenomenon ... constitutes 
nothing less than an economic and social revolution — a revolution shared with the 
rest of the Western world.... (Snooks 1994: 142)
Snooks’ view is widely shared. Women’s rapid entry into the workforce is regarded as an 
obvious fact, and not as a complex and debatable claim resting on contestable evidence. Yet 
in another way it has been perhaps the most ‘interpreted’ issue of our times. There are two 
levels here. On one level, the core of the issue has been treated as a simple matter of fact, but 
on another level the meaning of that supposed fact has been interpreted in multifarious ways. 
The interpreters all agree that it signifi es fundamental changes — for good or ill, according 
to one’s preferred perspective — in the home, the workplace, the economy and ultimately 
in the shape of Australian society. This paper will argue for two contrary contentions: fi rstly, 
there has been no revolution in women’s work, and secondly, the attempt to fi nd deeper 
signifi cance in women’s work trends is misguided.
The view I am contesting was well expressed in High Mackay’s Reinventing Australia: The 
Mind and Mood of Australia in the 90s. Mackay put women’s workforce involvement at the 
centre of his account of contemporary Australian life. For him, “There is no doubt about which 
of the redefi nitions of the past 20 years [that is, 1970 to 1990] has had the most impact on 
the Australian way of life: it is the redefi nition of gender roles which has taken place in the 
minds of roughly half the population — the female half”. Twenty years ago, he says, women 
were ‘second-class citizens’, reduced to acquiring “a kind of second-hand identity from the 
men they would marry”. Today, however, women say: “I am a person, entitled to the same 
sense of identity and the same status in our society as any other person”. This redefi nition 
changes their view of everything — of men, romance, sex, marriage, parenting, family life, 
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work, household management, and politics. And the key symbolic change in women’s lives, 
the one that they chose as the “expression of their new-found defi nition of gender”, was paid 
work (Mackay 1993: 24-25).
Mackay is not alone in this view. Graeme Snooks’ position on women’s entry into the 
workforce in the last half century is very similar to Mackay’s. For Snooks, there has been a 
revolution in women’s work, and its effects are far-reaching. He calls it “the greatest change 
in capitalist economies since the Industrial Revolution” (1994: 7). In consequence of the 
workforce change, birth rates and household size have fallen, marriage has become less 
necessary and divorce more common, family living standards have risen, and the demand for 
paid household services has risen with them. In general, family responsibilities have declined. 
Snooks differs from Mackay only — though importantly — in fi nding economic causes for 
what Mackay presents as the autonomous self-assertion of the ‘new woman’ (1994: 97-
149).1 
More recently, Anne Manne tells us that “We are in the midst of a social revolution: in women’s 
roles, and in the relations between the sexes. This revolution has had many consequences”. 
For her, the central contentious point in this revolution is “the increased employment of 
mothers of preschool children in many wealthy societies all over the world” (2006: 20).2 Fiona 
Stanley, Sue Richardson and Margot Prior present a somewhat less dramatic picture of 
women and work, but they still regard women’s entry into the workforce as bringing about ‘a 
new world order’, one requiring consequent adaptive changes that are yet to be made. “How 
the workplace, and modern society generally, respond to this new world order will be crucial 
for the future outcomes of our children and youth” (2005: 10-11).3
What is the evidence for this supposed revolution? In Mackay’s popular account it is nothing 
more than a one-sentence summary of the labour force participation (LFP) statistics. “In 
1970, 32 per cent of married women were in the workforce; by 1990, that fi gure had risen 
to 53 per cent of all married women and 60 per cent of all mothers with dependent children” 
(1993: 27). Snooks’ very academic discussion also rests its account of female workforce 
trends entirely on the labour force participation statistics (1994: 15-17). In this, Snooks and 
Mackay speak for the common view, the only evidence for which rests on LFP rates.4 This 
analysis is seriously inadequate, as I shall try to show.
Workforce Participation and Workforce Activity
There is no doubt that women’s labour force participation rates have changed dramatically 
over the past few decades, as Figure 1 shows.
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1 Allon J. Uhlmann (2006: 20; see also 166-67) explicitly follows Snooks’s portrayal: ‘These two processes — the 
development of technology and the increase in service industry — brought about a major realignment in Australia’s 
political economy in the form of a rapid increase in active participation of married women in the labour market’. 
However, he notes that men continued to work longer hours than women.
2 Later, she is more cautious, seemingly questioning the evidence for a revolution in women’s work (2006: 95-96).
3 They note four other major social changes: population ageing through declining birth rates and increasing 
longevity; globalisation, corporatisation, and increasing competition in the economic sphere; increases in divorce 
and sole parenthood; and the rapid growth of technological consumption.
4 Neither Manne nor Stanley et al offer any statistical support for their claims, yet they are clearly doing more than 
making rhetorical fl ourishes. Perhaps for them the claims have become taken-for-granted truisms.
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Figure 1: Labour Force Participation Rates:  Men, Women and Married Women Aged 15 
and Over, 1964–2008
Sources: ABS The Labour Force, Australia, Cat. No. 6203.0, (various); ABS Labour Statistics, Australia, Cat. No. 
6101.0 (various); ABS Labour Force Status and Other Characteristics of Families, Cat. No. 6224.0 (various); ABS 
(2000); ABS (2007).  
Notes: Some of these fi gures are also collected in Foster and Stewart (1991) and Reserve Bank of Australia. (1997). 
In the past forty-fi ve years, men’s labour force participation rate has fallen somewhat (from 
84 per cent to 72 per cent), but women’s has changed considerably, even radically. In 1964, 
33 per cent of all women aged 15 and over were in the workforce. Today the fi gure is 58 per 
cent. The trend has been steadily upwards. The trend for married women is similar, though 
steeper still — up from 25 per cent in 1964 to 59 per cent in 2003 (Foster and Stewart, 1991: 
152; ABS, Cat. No. 6203.0; ABS, 2000: 28; ABS, 2007, Work, Table 1.)5  These fi gures seem 
like impressive evidence of change. We might even choose to call the change a revolution, 
and we might postulate a wide range of effects that could fl ow from this fundamental change.
However, before we go further down this track, we need to focus on the core issue. Labour 
force participation rates tell us little, if anything, about actual time spent in paid work, yet they 
are commonly used as though they refl ected a person’s real workforce involvement. On the 
standard Australian Bureau of Statistics’ (ABS) defi nition of labour force participation, a person 
is deemed to be participating in the workforce if he or she has been in paid employment or 
has been looking for paid employment in the week before the labour force survey is taken. 
By that defi nition a person could move from non-participant to participant status simply by 
taking a few hours casual work each week or merely by deciding to look for work. We need 
to distinguish between workforce participation and workforce activity. Workforce activity is a 
matter of the amount of work performed, and it can be measured by tracking hours worked 
each week. Luckily, the ABS publishes two sets of data relevant to this indicator.
5 Regular LFP fi gures for married women have not been recorded since 2003. For a review of women’s LFP trends, 
see Evans and Kelley, 2004.
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Firstly, there is ABS data on aggregate hours worked by men and women, in a series that 
goes back to 1966. In Figure 2 aggregate hours worked is divided by the population of 
workforce age (15 to 64), to give an average hours worked per week by men and women. (It 
is assumed that very little of the aggregate fi gure is contributed by workers over age 64.) I will 
refer to this as the ‘hours worked’ series.
Figure 2:  Women’s and Men’s Average Weekly Hours Worked, 1966 to 2008
Sources: ABS The Labour Force, Australia, Cat. No. 6203.0, (various); ABS Labour Statistics, Australia, Cat. No. 
6101.0 (various); Also collected in Foster and Stewart (1991); Reserve Bank of Australia. (1997); and 
ABS (2007), see “Population”; Table 1: Work, Table 1.
Figure 2 suggests that changes have been at least as marked for men as for women. In 
four decades, men’s average weekly hours worked have fallen from 38.6 to 31.6, whereas 
women’s have risen from 13.8 to 19.0. The convergence between the men’s and women’s 
trendlines is coming as much from the men’s trend as from the women’s. Women’s hours 
as a proportion of all hours worked have risen from 26 per cent to 38 per cent, but this is as 
much explained by the decline in men’s average hours as by the rise in women’s hours. The 
men’s trend has been level since 1982. The upward trend in women’s work activity is steady 
but slow, growing at an overall rate of just over one hour per decade. More careful scrutiny 
shows that the trendline was fl at from 1966 to 1982, and since then has been rising at a rate 
of 1.5 hours per decade. This rate would see women reaching men’s present work levels in 
about the year 2100.
Our concern here is with the female side of this story. The labour force participation chart 
tells one story, the hours worked chart a much less dramatic one. In four decades since the 
mid-1960s, women’s LFP rate has almost doubled (up from 33 per cent to 58 per cent), while 
women’s hours worked have increased by about one-third (up from 13.8 hours per week to 




indicates that there has been no radical change of the sort supposed by Snooks, Mackay 
and others.
Secondly, we have ABS time use studies, based upon diaries kept by large sample populations 
of persons aged 15 and over. Four such studies have been conducted by the ABS: in 1987 
in Sydney; and in 1992, 1997, and 2006 Australia-wide (ABS, 1987; ABS, 1993; ABS, 1998; 
ABS, 2008).6  Table One summarises the key evidence, comparing the time use data (TU) 
with the hours worked (HW) data.7
Table 1: Male and Female Paid Work (Average Hours per Week): Comparing Time Use 
(TU) and Hours Worked (HW) Data
1987 1992 1997 2006
Men (TU) 30.9 28.5 27.4 28.7
Men (HW) 31.4 29.8 30.7 31.6
Women (TU) 14.7 13.4 13.8 14.1
Women (HW) 15.1 15.7 16.6 18.7
M-F Ratio (TU) 2.10 2.12 1.98 2.03
M-F Ratio (HW) 2.08 1.90 1.85 1.69
Sources: ABS The Labour Force, Australia, Cat. No. 6203.0, (various); ABS Labour Statistics, Australia, Cat. No. 
6101.0 (various); Also collected in Foster and Stewart (1991); ABS (1988); ABS(2008). 
Note: The time use fi gures include breaks and overtime, but not time spent travelling to and from work.
The time use fi gures for men show a very small downwards trend, at a time when the hours 
worked trend for men is fl at. But for women the time use trend is fl at, while the hours worked 
trend for the same period is slightly upwards. The ratio of male to female hours in the two 
data sets is almost identical in 1987, but subsequently the ratios diverge, with the hours 
worked ratio steadily falling, while the time use ratio remain fl at. The time use studies suggest 
that in the period 1987 to 2006 men performed about two-thirds of all paid work, and women 
one third. They indicate no rising trend in women’s work activity, and seem to leave no room 
for the revolutionary thesis.
It might be thought that a generational change is taking place but that its presence is 
emerging only very slowly in the average fi gures. Ideally, we would want a cohort analysis to 
track such trends. The time use fi gures do include some age-related data. Table Two shows 
that younger women in the age range 25 to 54 work about two hours per week more than 
women ten years older than them. Amongst older women (55-64) employment activity has 
increased sharply. 
6 There is an earlier time use study from 1974, conducted by the Cities Commission in Melbourne and Albury-
Wodonga. Its comparability with the ABS studies is questionable. See Cities Commission, n.d.
7 The hours worked fi gures are consistently higher than the time use fi gures, but that is to be expected, as the 
former is based on persons aged 15 to 64, whereas the time use fi gures cover all persons aged 15 and over, 
thereby including those who are in retirement. The larger time use divisor produces a lower average fi gure. 
Another slight distortion will arise from increased longevity. In the mid-1960s, average male longevity was 69 years 
and average female longevity 75 years. In 1987 it was 74 and 79 years respectively; today it is 79 and 84 years 
respectively. This increase will increase the time use divisor across time, and thus artifi cially reduce the average 
fi gure for paid work across time. However, the net effect of this distortion is small, depressing the 2006 fi gures by 
about 3 per cent.
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Table 2:  Women’s Paid Hours per Week, by Age Group (hours)
15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64
1992 17.8 18.4 19.5 19.3 6.5
 1997 17.5 20.7 19.2 20.4 7.6
2006 15.9 22.0 21.2 23.0 13.9
Sources: ABS (1993), Table 15; ABS (1998), Table 29; ABS (2008), Table 7.
This is some evidence of a generational trend, though the time span here is not great and the 
trend is not dramatic, except in the older age range. A careful cohort analysis of these fi gures 
would be useful, but that cannot be attempted here.8
Getting It Both Right and Wrong
Overall, then, the ABS hours worked fi gures show a general upwards trend in women’s work 
activity, but the rise is slow and slight, while in the ABS time use fi gures the trend is fl at. 
While commentators such as Mackay and Snooks have misconstrued the basic facts about 
women’s work trends, there are two studies that do get the core trends right. One is a 2002 
public lecture by economist Bob Gregory, who observes that:
Despite the rapid increase in education levels, despite large changes in social attitudes 
towards married women working in the labour market, despite large increases in labour 
market rewards and despite increased labour market involvement, the proportion of 
women 15 to 59 years employed full-time is much the same today as it was thirty-
fi ve years ago .... The overwhelming strategy has been to use part-time employment 
to add to the principal source of income which is delivered to women from a source 
outside their own full-time involvement in the labour market. (Gregory, 2002).9 
Gregory’s contention is correct, but it is based on fi gures for women’s full-time and part-time 
work, and lacks any more fi ne-grained evidence of actual hours worked.
Somewhat earlier, in 1994, economists Deborah Mitchell and Steve Dowrick set out the 
labour force participation and the hours worked trends for both men and women from 1978 
to 1993. They noted that LFP trends and hours worked trends (measured using the same 
sources as for Chart Two above) are ‘rather different’ for both men and women. On women’s 
work, they say that “Despite the large increase in the numbers of women participating in the 
labour force, their contribution to total hours is still only half that of men.” They note that in 
1978 women aged 15-64 worked on average 14.2 hours per week, amounting to 29 per 
cent of all hours worked by men and women; in 1993 it was 16.4 hours per week, equal to 
35 per cent of all hours worked. That is, in fi fteen years there had been rather little increase 
in women’s work activity. They then added: “In other words, the supply of labour by women 
outside the home is increasing but the potential supply is still substantially unused” (Mitchell 
and Dowrick, 1994: 4).
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8 The 1987 fi gures classify age ranges differently, and cannot be used for comparison purposes, though presumably 
the original data could be reclassifi ed.
9 Gregory’s main point is noted in Manne 2006: 95. Figures showing the fl at trend in women’s full-time work rates 
since 1971 had already been published in ABS, Social Indicators Number 5, Table 5.4, 205.
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Remarkably, despite this recognition of the small upwards trend in average hours worked, the 
remainder of their discussion is an attempt to explain why women’s labour supply has been 
increasing. In their view, three factors largely account for this increase: “the rapidly improving 
access of women to full secondary and tertiary education”, “decreased discrimination in 
both pay and employment”, and “shifting patterns of demand towards the service sector 
of the economy” (1994: 1). These factors may be good explanations, but what is being 
explained? In their account the key concept of ‘labour supply’ is left hanging ambiguously 
between participation and activity, but a moment’s refl ection shows that supply cannot be 
equated with participation. If average hours worked falls then labour supply has fallen, even 
if participation has risen. And since in fact women’s average hours worked have risen at 
most only slightly, women’s labour supply has risen at most only slightly. Since the rise is at 
most a minor one, there is nothing much that needs explanation. Discussion of education, 
discrimination and the services sector is unnecessary. Somehow Mitchell and Dowrick fail to 
see what is obvious from their own fi gures. It is a nice case of the way in which perspectives 
shape perceptions.10
Mitchell and Dowrick also offer no defence of their claim that women’s potential labour supply 
is still ‘substantially unused’. Given their evidence, that is obviously true, if they mean unused 
in the paid workforce, but it may be false if they mean unused simpliciter. Measuring use 
involves measuring capacity. Women may be doing other kinds of work, and they may be 
at or near the limits of their working capacity (given the general standards of their time and 
place). The time use studies shed light on this. Total work activity counts time spent in paid 
work, domestic work, childcare, voluntary work, education, and shopping. The fi rst three 
studies (1987, 1992, 1997) showed a close equivalence between men’s and women’s total 
work activities. The 1997 study reported that “Men and women spent almost the same 
average amount of time on total work (425 minutes and 432 minutes [per day] respectively)”, 
a difference of seven minutes per day more by women than by men (ABS, 1998: 7, and Table 
1, 17). The 2006 study presents a different picture. It found that men average 526 minutes 
total work per day and women 593 minutes, which adds up to about 8 hours more work per 
week by women (ABS, 2008: Table 4). Whichever of these stories is correct, overall women 
are not working less than men, so there are no grounds for thinking of them as relatively 
under-employed.
Causal Stories
The core facts, then, are not what they are commonly taken to be. The overall story is clear 
enough: a markedly higher percentage of women are in paid work, but average hours worked 
have risen slightly and slowly (on the hours worked fi gures) or hardly at all (on the time use 
fi gures). We can sum this up by saying that paid work has been distributed more broadly 
and evenly across the female population. Consequently, the task for economists and social 
scientists is not to explain what Snooks called “the rush of female household workers to join 
the market workforce”. Such a rush has occurred but it has added very little to women’s 
average paid work activity. Rather, the problem to be explained is why work activity has not 
increased strongly. This is a problem not because it is diffi cult to square rising participation 
rates with nearly fl at activity rates — that presents no great diffi culty. The problem is how to 
reconcile the low or nil rise in activity with the plausible reasons we have for expecting activity 
to have risen strongly.
10 Bettina Cass (2002: 144) follows Mitchell and Dowrick’s analysis of women’s rising LFP, though without remarking 
on their recognition that the trend in women’s hours worked has remained fl at.
11 For a more recent analysis of the literature on female labour supply, see Birch, 2005. She emphasises the 
complexity of the subject — no simple or single factor predominates in determining women’s labour supply.
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A number of hypotheses designed to explain a rise in women’s work have been already 
mentioned. Rising levels of education, growing demand for work in the services sector, 
decreased discrimination against women as workers, removal of legal barriers against 
women’s work, and the rise of feminist beliefs and attitudes will all — it seems reasonable to 
suppose — have tended to increase female work activity. Snooks makes a case for the claim 
that a strong postwar rise in the ratio of capital to labour has driven the labour market to seek 
out workers in the tertiary sector, where women have some comparative advantage over men 
(1994: 97-123). The steep decline in the birth rate must also have made work outside the 
home easier to combine with childcare responsibilities. Empirical support for at least some of 
these contentions is readily available. For example, a study by M.D.R. Evans (1988) showed 
the expected strongly positive correlation between, on the one hand, education and feminist 
orientation and, on the other, workforce participation. Evans showed also that the birth of 
children lowers workforce participation dramatically, from which we can assume that a drop 
in the birth rate would tend to raise work activity.
It would take us off the present track to attempt an evaluation of these various hypotheses. 
They may seem plausible enough. Yet the evidence of the present essay leaves us in the odd 
position of having good explanations for something that — if our focus is on work activity and 
not merely on workforce participation — has not happened to any marked degree. Faced 
with this, we can go in two very different ways. We can use the non-happening of the thing 
to be explained to discredit the would-be explanations; or we can accept the explanations 
as valid and postulate that some other factor or force must be operating to prevent the effect 
from following from the supposed cause. Neither move is particularly compelling. A good 
explanation remains a good explanation even if, on some particular occasion, it fails to be 
followed by the expected effect. Something might be blocking the usual mechanism. The 
sensible strategy is to look for the spanner in the works, and then, only when we are sure 
there is none to be found, give up the explanatory theory.
In this case, however, there is no compelling theory about what might be doing the blocking. 
Legal barriers to women’s paid employment have fallen in the period. The only candidate that 
comes readily to mind is women’s rising relative wage rates. A rise in the female/male wage 
ratio will of course increase female labour supply but — arguably — it will lower employer 
demand. The rise has been a large one, increasing from 0.55 in the 1930s to 0.93 in the 
1970s, according to Snooks. He shows that it has stayed around that fi gure since that 
time (until 1990) (1994: 143; Table 8.16, 222). In his account of rising female labour market 
participation, Snooks constructed a regression model in which he tested the thesis that 
market participation might be a linear function of changing female wage rates relative to 
men’s, of changes in the birth rate, and of change in the capital/labour ratio. Using data from 
1946 to 1985, he found that, by itself, the capital/labour ratio could account for 98 per cent 
of the variation in female participation (1994: 88). This suggests that relative wage rates are 
a minor factor in LFP trends. Interesting though this is, the interest would be much greater if 
his analysis told us anything about work activity. Since LFP is very different from activity we 




One possible explanation of increases in women’s paid work is simply that women today 
have on average one or two children fewer than women a few decades ago. They therefore 
have more time on their hands, and part-time work fi lls that time quite nicely. This is a neat 
explanation except for the fact that it can be so easily reversed: it is equally possible that 
women have fewer children because they are working more.12  But what if women are not 
working much more today than they were in the 1960s? The last four decades have been the 
era of the baby bust. The fertility rate has fallen from 3.5 children per woman in 1961 to 1.8 
today (ABS, 1992: Table 2.3.1, 54, and ABS, 2007: 1.) Yet women’s average work activity is 
not much greater at the bottom of the baby bust than what it was at the height of the baby 
boom. Given this, then obviously the baby bust cannot be explained by increases in women’s 
paid work. The interesting issue is why increased work does not follow much more strongly 
from such a marked reduction in fertility. No obvious explanation comes to mind. The birth 
rate trends simply make the whole problem more puzzling.13
Indeed we seem to have not even the beginnings of a plausible theory to make sense of the 
actual trends in women’s work, largely because the actual trends have been misconstrued, 
owing to the failure to distinguish between participation and activity.
Possible Consequences and Implications
Interpretations abound of the meaning and ramifi cations of these supposed trends, focused 
mainly on questions of women’s identity and role and on secondary effects on the family. 
Hugh Mackay, for example, contends that the key change in recent Australian life is women’s 
redefi nition of their social role, arising mainly from their new participation in the workforce. 
Other social phenomena — female fatigue, eating out, out-of-home childcare, talk of ‘quality 
time’ with children, tension between spouses over housework, high divorce rates, male 
backlash, etc — are presented as a by-product of this re-defi nition. As with Mackay, so with 
many others: the story of women’s entry into the paid workforce is no bare factual account. 
It is almost always told in such a way that it is made to seem charged with signifi cance. The 
story centres on a core of supposed fact, which for many functions as an article of faith, one 
which tells us that the world really is moving forwards, and for others is a sign of decline, a 
movement away from the time-honoured order of the male provider and the female nurturer.
Post-sixties feminism has taken a number of forms, but one thing the various feminisms have 
in common is the doctrine that paid work is personally benefi cial. For women with children 
the main alternative to paid work is life as a homemaker and parent. Many feminists have 
thought that paid work is a good thing partly because it can be challenging and interesting, 
but equally because it frees women from homemaking and childcare. In the past, this story 
supposes, women’s talents have been dammed behind the wall of the family. Now the wall 
has been breached — by feminism, or technology, or market forces, or whatever — and 
those talents have been set free to energise the wider society. The story tends to leave family 
life in limbo, as a condition which has merely been left behind, when in reality many who 
accept the story also want family success of a fairly traditional sort.
12 This is how Snooks argues. On his account, rising female wages and marked increases in demand for female 
labour explain the decline in the other sort of female labour. His economic model, he claims, can explain ‘99 
per cent of the change in family size’ in the period 1946 to 1990. ‘Hence the fi rst great change in the size of the 
Australian household in a century ... can be explained virtually entirely in terms of fundamental economic forces’ 
(1994: 68-69).
13 A further complicating possibility is that some of the small increase of women’s paid work hours is work that was 
previously done in the home. Housework has been to some degree commodifi ed. What was once unpaid work is 
now low paid work.
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The story is nothing if not familiar. But consider its photographic negative, as told by the 
conservative social commentator, B.A. Santamaria. As he saw it, four main factors work 
against the health and strength of the modern family: the divorce revolution, as facilitated by 
the Family Law Act; the sexual revolution, as commercialised by Hollywood and television; 
the rise of radical feminism in the bureaucracies, the media and the universities; and “the 
industrialization of married women by their progressive absorption into the paid workforce” 
(1995: 8-9). Of these four he believed the last of these to be the most powerful.
According to Santamaria, this absorption takes two forms: in one, a minority of educated 
professional women seek personal fulfi lment in a career; in the other, a majority of working or 
lower middle class women are compelled into the workforce by the relative economic decline 
of families with children. In consequence of the second trend — not the fi rst — “The strength 
of the family and its capacity to fulfi l its various social functions rapidly broke down under the 
strain….” (1995: 11). That second trend is a product not of women’s free choices but of market 
forces, forces let loose by governments, employers and economic theorists, who saw an 
opportunity to drive down the wages of male breadwinners by forcing them to compete with 
women workers.14  Santamaria supports his account with evidence of economic polarisation, 
using taxable income fi gures said to show that the middle is being squeezed out by the rapid 
growth in the proportion of higher and lower income types. The failure, under pressure, of the 
modern family is evidenced by rising levels of divorce, sole parenthood, unemployment, youth 
suicide, and sexual abuse of children in non-standard family types. Behind his story lies an 
assumption about the importance of the ‘biological’ family.
We have, then, two main story types, feminist and conservative, sharing a single account 
of the workforce trends and agreeing that those trends are hugely important, but seeing 
very different implications in them. It is easy to lose sight of their central assumption — that 
women have been undergoing progressive ‘industrialisation’. On the work activity evidence, 
both feminists and conservatives are arguing from a crucial false premise. Whatever gains 
or losses women have made or the family has incurred, none can be accounted for by the 
general work trends. The point can be generalised: there are no recent social changes, good 
or bad, which can be explained by a general growth in women’s paid work activity, for the 
simple reason that there has been very little such growth.
Two commentators, Hugh Mackay and Anne Manne, combine elements of feminism and 
conservatism in interesting ways. Mackay’s position is far less black and white than the 
typical feminist and conservative accounts, but it turns on exactly the same axis. On his view 
the family is being redefi ned, in ways involving both gain and pain. This redefi nition follows 
from women’s self-redefi nition, but in a somewhat complex way:
It is probably true that much of the present instability in Australian family life springs 
from changes in the role and status of women, but not in the simplistic way often 
assumed by those who try to forge a direct causal link between the working mother 
and the unstable family. The real connection is far more subtle than that: it has to do 
with the fact that women’s roles have become much less easy to defi ne and, as a 
result, the transition from being a girl to becoming a mother appears to be a more 
demanding, more confusing, more complex and more painful transition than it was for 
previous generations of women. (1993: 65-66).
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14 On the central importance of market forces as drivers of workforce change, Santamaria (1995) and Snooks (1994) 
are in agreement; Uhlmann (2006), however, argues that there is a two-way interaction between market forces and 
the gendered structure of the household.
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Today’s grandmothers generally followed a single path: school, work, marriage, children, 
retirement. Then came what Mackay calls the “pioneering generation of working mothers” 
who broke this mould (1993: 47). Younger women today play multiple roles which “tend to 
diminish the relative signifi cance of each one of those roles”. “They are so used to making 
choices — and to the idea of staying fl exible — that the infl exible and irrevocable reality of 
parenthood comes as something of a shock”. This makes them “much more ambivalent 
about mothering and [much more] fl exible about the nature of family life than their own 
mothers were” (1993: 67-68).
Unfortunately, Mackay’s ‘pioneering generation’ is diffi cult to locate in the work activity 
evidence. No doubt there was a generation of women in the 1970s who pioneered new ways 
of thinking about work and its relation to personal identity. But Mackay’s account requires 
widespread changes in work behaviour (the exercising of real choice), not just in ways of 
talking about work, if it is to explain family change or anything else. That evidence is lacking.
Manne’s main concern in Motherhood is that the rise of women’s work has led to the loss of 
parental time with children, but she also places strong emphasis on the gains women have 
made in the workforce. Many who support the revolutionary thesis do so in part because 
they favour the liberation of women from the home. Others accept the thesis but, like Manne, 
worry that increases in women’s paid work are tending to take time and energy away from 
children’s nurture. Since the general trend for women’s paid work is rising only very slowly, 
this concern could be justifi ed only if the trend for mothers work is quite different from that for 
women in general. The ABS hours worked data tell us nothing about the paid work of parents 
of dependent children, but the 1987, 1992 and 1997 time use surveys include comparisons 
between sole mothers, married fathers and married mothers.
























13.7 47.0 11.6 12.7 42.9 13.8 15.6 42.0 13.7
Sources: ABS (1988), Table 1.6; ABS (1993), Table 22; ABS (1998), Table 10. 
Note: The 2006 time use study does not include fi gures on married couples and sole parents.
Here the twenty-year trend shows a small rise in married mothers’ hours worked, and a small 
fall in married fathers’ hours worked. In general married fathers do about three times as much 
paid work as their partners. Married mothers work about the same hours per week as the 
average for all women, while married fathers work much more than the average for all men 
(about 42 hours per week, compared with about 28 hours per week). The fi gures for sole 
mothers show a small upward trend, much like that for married mothers.15
15 Time use fi gures on sole fathers are available but are not likely to be reliable.
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The time use fi gures in Table Three — which is the best evidence we have — do suggest a 
weak tendency towards reduced maternal time with children. But two further factors need 
to be taken into account. Firstly, as already noted, the birth rate has fallen sharply in the 
post-1965 period, so increases in mothers’ paid work may simply be occupying time freed 
up by that fall. And, secondly, as Table Three shows, fathers’ time available for children 
has increased more than women’s time has decreased, so children today may enjoy a net 
increase in parental time compared with 1987. Looking as far back as the evidence will take 
us (1987), we can fi nd no general trend showing children being cast aside by their work-
obsessed parents. Once again, the revolutionary thesis — this time in its conservative version 
— is contradicted by the evidence.16
Conclusion
As this discussion has illustrated, social trends can be interpreted in diverse ways. There is a 
feminist interpretation and a conservative interpretation of women’s supposed work trends, 
and there are also hybrid interpretations such as those put forward by Mackay and Manne. 
And, of course, one cannot win any arguments about the merits of a trend merely by citing 
the trend — history may be progressing or it may be retrogressing. What is surprising is 
the remarkable consensus between proponents of quite opposed interpretations about the 
basic direction of the trends. Although two studies — those by Mitchell and Dowrick and 
by Gregory — have supplied good grounds to question the consensus, those studies have 
largely gone unheeded.
Australia is fortunate in having good ABS fi gures on hours worked, going back to 1964, 
and, since 1987, good time use studies. This paper has attempted to bring this important 
evidence into focus. The main theses of the paper are, fi rstly, that female work patterns have 
changed much less in recent decades than is commonly thought, and, secondly, that since 
this is so, general trends in women’s work behaviour cannot be used to explain other social 
phenomena. It remains possible that signifi cant changes are taking place in some sections 
of the female population (for example, amongst some professionals), even while the overall 
pattern is stable, but this has to be treated as no more than conjecture. New evidence will 
need to be brought forward before we can be confi dent of any such trends or effects.
The methodological moral of the story is that labour force participation fi gures are not a 
reliable guide to workplace trends. As Catherine Hakim put it back in 1993, the “headcount 
approach is not well suited to women’s work histories with long spells in permanent part-
time jobs, repeated movement in and out of the labour force, seasonal and casual work, and 
jobs taken as and when they are available” (1993: 108). Both popular belief and academic 
theory have generally assumed that economic change (structural adjustment, increased 
international competition, microeconomic reform, the rise of the services sector) and social 
change (women’s liberation from the home) impact on women’s work rates, and that LFP 
fi gures are a reliable index of this impact. These assumptions need to be questioned. The 
LFP rate is not a reliable index, and more reliable indicators show that these background 
changes have had little impact across time on women’s paid work activity.
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16 The situation of children of sole parents may be different. In general, sole mothers have slightly fewer children than 
married mothers and tend to have a little less paid work, so they will normally have more time available to spend 
with their children. But of course the children of sole parents are likely to get less total parental time owing to the 
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Following recent falls in international student commencements in Australia, there has 
been a renewed call for a revision to student visa policy. In response to this discussion 
the Commonwealth Government established the Knight Review of the Student Visa 
Program in December 2010. This paper discusses several policy options following a 
comparative analysis of student visa systems in Australia, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. The underlying fi nding is that Australia’s student 
visa system is more complex, more costly and imposes greater fi nancial obligations 
on international students and their families than comparable countries. Australia could 
benefi t from an overall simplifi cation of its student visa system, including a streamlining 
of the number of visas available to students and a reduction in the stringency of the 
tests applied in regard to fi nancial capacity and proof of funding. In addition, attention 
should be paid to post-study employment options under the student visa system and 
the nexus between higher education attainment and immediate work options. 
Over the course of 2009-10, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) 
announced a series of changes to Australia’s student visa program with a view to tightening 
eligibility requirements and ensuring systemic integrity.1 These changes were a response to 
perceived abuse of the program by certain private colleges, in particular the use of certain 
vocational courses as a backdoor method of achieving permanent residency, as well as wider 
public debate about population targets and the level of immigration to Australia. Measures 
taken included tightening the level of assessment for certain countries as well as increases 
in the mandated basic rate of living costs for a student which had the effect of increasing the 
up-front fi nancial requirements for applicants. Further, in February 2010, DIAC announced 
changes to the General Skill Migration (GSM) program and in May to the Skilled Occupation 
List (SOL) which also affected post-study options for future students2. These culminated in 
November 2010 with the announcement of a new points test to assess independent skilled 
migrants.3
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Partly as a consequence of these changes and other factors such as the higher Australian 
dollar, there was an overall contraction in the number of international students seeking to 
study in Australia, the fi rst such retrenchment in over a decade.4 This has led to calls for a 
policy response from government, including changes to the student visa system to ensure 
comparability with visa systems in competitor countries. 
In response to such calls and more general concerns, the Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship, Chris Bowen MP, and Minister for Tertiary Education, Skills, Jobs and Workplace 
Relations, Senator Chris Evans jointly announced in December 2010 the creation of an inquiry 
into the system by former New South Wales Labor Minister, Michael Knight AC. The report is 
due by the middle of 2011.5
A signifi cant point of contention in this debate is the extent to which Australia’s student visa 
system conforms with or diverges from systems in other countries. To further inform this 
debate, this paper provides an overview and comparison of student visa systems in fi ve 
countries – Australia, the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Canada and New 
Zealand – with a view to making recommendations as to how the Australian system might 
be modifi ed in specifi c relation to higher education in Australia, in view of practice elsewhere. 
Before doing so, we will look at recent developments in international education in Australia. 
Recent Trends in International Higher Education in Australia.
Recent Trends in International Higher Education in Australia
Motivating the discussion surrounding student visa policy is the increasing importance of 
international education to Australia. The sector is an Australian export success story. From 
a small base it has now become Australia’s third largest export sector behind coal and iron 
ore, and is the largest service export sector in the economy, worth around $19.1 billion in 
2010.6  There has been rapid growth in recent years in the sector (see Table 1), with student 
numbers increasing by 80 per cent over the fi ve years to 2010 (to November). Growth has 
been distributed across the sector (except Schools), with both the VET (252 per cent) and 
ELICOS (73 per cent) segments experiencing especially rapid growth since 2005. The higher 
education sector has seen 35 per cent growth in enrolments between 2005 and 2010, 
coming off a larger and more established base.  
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4 For a discussion of recent trends and future prospects, see Phillimore, J and P Koshy (2010), The Economic 
Implications of Fewer International Higher Education Students in Australia, A report to the Australian Technology 
Network (ATN), available at: http://www.atn.edu.au/newsroom/Docs/2010/August_2010_Economic_implications_
of_fewer_international_higher_education_students_in_Australia.pdf
5 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010), ‘Review of the student visa program’, available at:
http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/media-releases/2010/cb10089.htm




TABLE 1: International Onshore Student Enrolments, By Sector, 2005 to 2010 
(November)




162,688 169,591 174,254 181,392 203,324 219,184 35 %
VET 65,580 82,532 119,646 174,558 232,475 230,799 252 %
ELICOS 64,556 76,855 101,961 126,785 135,141 111,672 73 %
Schools 25,093 24,471 26,764 28,308 27,506 24,278 -3 %
Other 26,248 26,426 27,299 30,123 31,472 31,238 19 %
Total 344,165 379,875 449,924 541,166 629,918 617,171 79 %
Source: Australian Education International (AEI) (2011)7
Such growth has provided increased income for higher education institutions. Figures on 
Australian higher education provider fi nances for 2009 from the Department of Education, 
Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) show that the revenue item ‘Fee Paying 
Overseas Students’ was equal to $3.4 billion and accounted for 16.7 per cent of all revenue 
from continuing operations ($20.4 billion).8 While a proportion of this is from offshore 
operations, it does indicate the importance of international students to the sector. This 
revenue enabled them to expand opportunities for all students and devote resources to 
research activity.
However, a combination of factors in the past 18 months has put the international education 
sector under pressure. As Universities Australia (UA) puts it, “we are faced with a ‘perfect 
storm’ of factors coming together to threaten Australia’s position as a preferred destination 
for an educational experience”.9  The factors cited by UA and others include:
• A stronger Australian dollar;
• The impact of the global fi nancial crisis on demand for places;
• Increased competition from other countries seeking international students, in 
particular the USA;
• Reputational damage caused by highly publicised attacks on international students;
• The collapse of some private colleges;
• Signifi cant changes to student visa rules and skilled migration; and
• The 2010 federal election campaign discussion of immigration and population 
issues.
These factors have had the effect of slowing or reducing international student enrolments, 
with prospects of more to come. The effects of policy-induced changes to student visas and 
skilled migration, the most important of which came into effect only quite recently, are likely to 
7 AEI (2011), op.cit.
8 Figures derived from Table 1 in DEEWR (2010) Financial Reports of Higher Education Providers 2009,
http://www.deewr.gov.au/HigherEducation/Publications/FinanceReports/Documents/Finance2009.pdf
9 Universities Australia (2010) ‘Balanced migration policy, not a ‘Fortress Australia’’, Media Release No. 13/10,
27 July.
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be only seen in the coming months. The most recent commencement data from Australian 
Education International (AEI) for the year-to-date to November 2010 show a decline in overall 
commencements in the onshore international sector of around 9.3 per cent on a year on
year basis.
While higher education was still trending upward with commencements to November 2010 
of 90,310, up 2.35 per cent on the 2009 equivalent fi gure of 88,234, the other three key 
sectors have all seen a marked decline in enrolments: VET commencements to November 
2010 were at 119,356, down by 8.17 per cent; Schools at 10,895, down by 15.84 per cent; 
and ELICOS at 81,778, down by 21.27 per cent from November 2009. 
FIGURE 1: International Onshore Commencements Data, By Sector, Year-to-Date, 
November 2010
Source: AEI (2010)10
There is further evidence from other sources indicating that the higher education sector will 
see a weakening in international student enrolments over the latter half of 2010 and a decline 
in 2011. According to DIAC, grants for the higher education visa (the 573 visa) declined 
in 2009-10 to 118,541 grants, a decrease of 11.5 per cent on 2008-9 grants of 133,990. 
Almost all this decline can be accounted for by a huge decline in the number of visa grants 
to higher education students from India (from 27,717 in 2008-09 to 10,988 in 2009-10 – a 
fall of almost 17,000). It should also be noted that the critical category in this regard is that 
of offshore grants, which declined to 68,247 grants in 2009-10 from 90,859 grants in 2008-
9, a fall of 24.9 per cent. Again, this was largely the consequence of a decline in Indian 
applications. 
Offsetting this change somewhat was the relatively healthy outcome for the postgraduate 
research visa, the 574 visa, where grants rose from 8,354 in 2008-9 to 9,301 in 2009-
54
10 AEI (2010) Market Information Package, Pivot Table (November 2010).
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10, an increase of 11.3 per cent. Overall, combined onshore and offshore grants for higher 
education visas fell by around 10.2 per cent in the 2009-10 program year.
TABLE 2: Combined Onshore and Offshore Grants for the 573 (‘Higher Education’) and 
574 (‘Postgraduate Research’) visas 
573 Visa 574 Visa Total Higher
Education
Combined Onshore and Offshore Grants
2008-09 133,990 8,354 142,344
2009-10 118,541 9,301 127,842
% change -11.5 % 11.3 % -10.2 %
Offshore Grants Only
2008-09 90,859 5,278 96,137 
2009-10 68,247 5,372 73,619 
% change -24.9 % 1.8 % -23.4 %
Source: DIAC (2010) 11
Players in international education – particularly in the key higher education sector – have 
demanded some response from government. Primarily this call has centred around student 
visa policy and the ongoing impact of changes in this area on student numbers, as one 
of the few factors affecting international enrolments directly within government control. The 
other, the management of quality accreditation of private colleges, has already been dealt 
with through a review of the Education Services for Overseas Students (ESOS) Act 2000 (the 
Baird Review).12
Student Visa Systems in Australia and Overseas 
To better understand how Australia’s visa system compares with other countries involved in 
international education, we undertook a comparison of the student visa systems of Australia, 
the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), Canada and New Zealand (NZ). These countries 
were chosen because the fi rst four together account for 45 per cent of the international 
student market13, while New Zealand was also included because of its geographical proximity 
to Australia and key source markets. Details on the visa systems were obtained by analysis of 
the websites of the immigration departments of each country. The specifi c features selected 
for comparison were the cost of a visa; fi nancial requirements; the evidence required to be 
shown about these requirements; standard visa processing times; work allowance rules for 
students once they are in the host country; and post-study work and residency conditions.
Appendix 1 provides summary data and references for each point of comparison across the 
fi ve countries.
11 Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2010), Student Visa Statistics, ‘Offshore and Onshore Grants 
Combined,’ various, available at: http://www.immi.gov.au/media/statistics/study/
12 Review of the Education Services for Overseas Students (ESOS) Act 2000, available at: http://www.aei.gov.au/AEI/
GovernmentActivities/InternationalStudentsTaskforce/ESOS_REview_Final_Report_Feb_2010_pdf.pdf
13 Wood, John (2010) ‘Internationalisation in a globalised context – challenges, rewards and the rise of the ‘student 
customer’ Presentation to Plymouth Conference, 30 June 2010.
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Australia 
Australia does not have a universal student visa, but issues specifi c sub class visas at each 
level of education. The relevant sub class visas for higher education are Sub Class 573 
(Higher Education) and 574 (Postgraduate Research) visas, with the VET, ELICOS and school 
sectors having separate visa subclasses.14  Australia is also somewhat unique in having an 
‘assessment’ system consisting of different levels across country and levels of study. 
Visa Cost: Both visas cost A$550.
Financial Requirements: Australian regulations are particularly specifi c in regard to the costing 
and conditions of fi nancial requirements. Applicants for the 573 and 574 visas must declare 
that they have enough money to pay for travel, tuition and living expenses for themselves, 
their partner and dependent children for the duration of their stay in Australia. They must also 
have enough money to support their partner and dependent children, even if they do not 
travel with the applicant to Australia. 
For instance, in the case of a single student undertaking a three year business undergraduate 
program, the minimum requirements for this sub class visa assessment level would include: 
Travel:  Applicant’s return air fare to Australia.
Tuition Costs: Course fees for applicant, which can be around A$30,000 per annum.
Living Costs: A$18,000 per year.
Total: Around A$48,000 per annum or A$144,000 over the duration of the entire three year 
course.15  (Note that costs are even higher for students with a spouse and/or children. 
Students must cover living expenses for both, plus annual schooling costs of A$8,000 per 
school-aged child).
On this basis, single applicants need to demonstrate fi nancial resources of around A$144,000.
Evidence of Funds: Students need to demonstrate that they can cover the total course costs 
of $144,000 for a typical three year bachelor’s degree before they are issued with a visa.
The level of evidence required to prove this level of fi nancial preparedness depends upon 
DIAC’s assessment of risk associated with a given country for the particular visa class being 
sought. This is measured by ‘Assessment Levels’ which rise with from 1 to 4, with Level 
1 being assessed as relatively low risk in terms of common immigration parameters (e.g., 
breaching terms of the sub visa) and Level 4 being a higher risk. 
In the case of a student seeking to obtain a 573 visa from a Level 1 country such as Singapore 
or Malaysia, fi nancial support can be sourced from anywhere to provide for fi nancial 
56
14 Other visas include: 570 (Independent ELICOS), 571 (Schools) and 572 (Vocational Education and Training).
15 Tuition costs vary by university as well as by course type and length. For a three year bachelor degree in 
commerce, fees at Australian universities are typically between A$18,000 and A$30,000 pa. In some universities, 
fees for courses in science and engineering are greater, while medical fi elds are normally quite a deal higher. Based 
on tuition costs of A$30,000 pa for a three year course, the fi nancial requirement to obtain a student visa (including 
living expenses of A$18,000 pa) is A$144,000.
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resources over the full period of study for the applicant and any accompanying dependents. 
Only Applications from Level 1 countries can be lodged online, with recent changes granting 
exceptions to China, India, Thailand and Indonesia.
In the case of a student applying from a country that is assessed at Level 4 the level of proof 
required is substantially more onerous. Money must be deposited with an approved fi nancial 
institution and must have been held for at least six consecutive months immediately before 
the date of the visa application, which in practice could amount to eight to nine months if 
assessment times are taken into account. Proof of funding must include the source of funds, 
be it from family, government or sponsoring agencies. 
Processing Times: Processing times for applications for higher education sub class visas 
range from up to 14 days for Assessment Level 1 countries to 90 days for Level 4 countries. 
Work Allowances: Since 26 April 2010, students require permission from DIAC to seek 
work while they study. Students can work for up to 20 hours a week when their course is 
in session and for unlimited hours during scheduled course breaks. Work associated with 
formal course compliance or voluntary work is not included in the 20 hour limit. Australia’s 
system is generally less restrictive in terms of spouse/partner working conditions than is the 
case for the other countries surveyed. 
Post-study work and residency conditions: Post-study work requires a new visa, either via a 
work visa or a permanent residence visa directly linked to their completion of studies. Students 
can apply for a variety of visas including: Skilled Independent (Residence) Visa (Subclass 
885); Skilled Sponsored (Residence) Visa (Subclass 886); Skilled Regional (Residence) Visa 
(Subclass 887); Skilled Regional Sponsored (Provisional) Visa (Subclass 487) and Skilled 
Graduate (Temporary) Visa (Subclass 485).  
United States
The US has a stand-alone student visa, the F-1 visa, which covers students attending higher 
education institutions at any level. The F-1 visa is granted for up to fi ve years in most cases 
(in the case of students from China, it is for one year only) and can be extended further for the 
duration of study. The US also has the M-1 visa for students undertaking vocational courses. 
The number of M-1 visa holders is quite small.   
Visa Cost: US$140
Financial Requirements: The US system relies upon fi nancial evidence being collected at the 
institutional level (i.e. by universities). Financial evidence must show that the applicant or their 
family/sponsors have suffi cient funds to cover tuition and living expenses during the period 
of their intended study. This is declared on the Department of Homeland Security’s I-20 Form 
which is fi lled out as part of a student’s application to their chosen institution. 
Required fi nancial resources will depend upon the tuition and board costs for the applicant’s 
college, but must be demonstrated for one year. 
Typically, one year’s board and tuition is around US$40,000 (A$40,500). 
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Evidence of Funds: Evidence of funds in the US system focuses on proof of capacity to 
pay rather than proof of source. Admitted evidence includes: income tax documents and 
original bank books and/or statements and/or business registration, licenses, etc., and tax 
documents, as well as original bank books and/or statements.
Processing Times: Visa waiting times are substantially reduced in the US system, in part 
because of the reduced requirement to provide evidence of fi nancial capacity but also 
because of the level of data collected by institutions. Typically, waiting times for the F-1 
student visa range from one day in Singapore to 6 days in China (Shanghai).
Work Allowances: Students can only work on campus in the fi rst year of enrolment. Thereafter, 
they can work off campus in a capacity related to their studies, subject to approval by the 
Designated School Offi cial (a person authorised to maintain Student and Exchange Visitor 
Information System (SEVIS)) and the US Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), and 
where they meet one of three criteria:
• Curricular Practical Training (CPT);
• Optional Practical Training (OPT) (pre-completion or post-completion); and
• Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Optional Practical 
Training Extension (OPT)
Work is limited to 20 hours a week during courses (although allowances can be made where 
hardship is demonstrated) and up to 40 hours a week during scheduled breaks.
Post-study work and residency conditions: An F-1 visa allows a student to remain in the US 
for an additional 60 days after their nominated course has been completed. This allows for the 
commencement of Optional Practical Training (OPT) which can extend to one year. In addition, 
OPT can be extended by an additional 17 months in the case of students with qualifi cations 
in Science, Technology, Engineering or Mathematics (the so-called ‘STEM’ areas). Thereafter, 
students may apply for temporary or permanent visas, including employment-based visas 
and temporary visas such as the H1-B and the O-1 visas.
United Kingdom 
The student visa in the UK is the Tier 4 visa.
Visa Cost: £220 (A$354)
Financial Requirements: Applicants for the Tier 4 visa need to accrue 40 points in total. Of 
these 30 points are attributable to the provision of a Confi rmation of Acceptance of Studies 
(CAS) document, an online document provided by an approved sponsor (higher education 
institution). The last 10 points are awarded upon the satisfaction of the maintenance funds 
requirement.  
The maintenance amount for the main applicant is calculated at: £800 per month for 
applicants intending to study in the Inner London Boroughs; and £600 per month for those 




Maintenance must be demonstrated as follows: 
For courses of up to 9 months duration: The full tuition fee plus the appropriate monthly 
amount for each month in the UK.
For courses over 9 months: The fi rst year of the tuition fees plus either £7200 or £5400 
depending on whether they intend to study inside or outside of the Inner London Boroughs. 
Tuition fees for international students are around £9,300 per annum for classroom-based 
courses.
On this basis, the cost calculated for the fi rst year of a classroom undergraduate course 
(tuition and board) outside London is typically around £14,700 (A$23,667).
Evidence of Funds: Funds must be held in the applicant’s personal bank account or that of 
their parent(s)/legal guardian’s bank account for a consecutive 28 day period (fi nishing on the 
date of the closing balance) and ending no more than one month before their application.
Processing Times: Processing times for the Tier 4 visa are typically up to 30 days for most 
countries.  
Work Allowances: Under the Tier 4 (General) visa, students in foundation degrees may only 
work for up to 20 hours per week.
Post-study work and residency conditions: Students can remain in the UK for a full 4 
months after the completion of their course for courses of more than 12 months in duration. 
Thereafter, they can pursue a range of immigration options in the UK, including the most 
immediate option of a Tier 1 (Post-study work) visa. 
Canada 
The student visa in Canada is the Study Permit.  
  
Visa Cost: C$125 (A$124)
Financial Requirements:  Applicants are required to demonstrate fi nancial capacity to cover 
tuition and living costs for a 12 month period. For a single student tuition costs are assessed 
to be C$10,000 for a 12 month period or $833 a month (these are 10 per cent higher in 
Quebec). Tuition fees for international students are around C$15,500 per annum. 
On this basis, the typical level of funds required to obtain the Study Permit is around C$25,500 
(A$25,310).
Evidence of Funds:  Evidence is required to prove that the applicant can support themselves 
and accompanying family members while they study in Canada.  This may include: proof of 
a Canadian bank account in their name with money transferred to Canada; the applicant’s 
bank statements for the past four months; a bank draft in convertible currency; proof of 
payment of tuition and residence fees; and – for those with a scholarship or those with a 
Canadian funded educational program – proof of funding paid from within Canada. 
No proof for the source of funding is required. 
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Processing Times: Around 71 per cent of applications for the Student Permit are processed 
in less than 28 days, with 14 per cent in 2 days or less.
Work Allowances: Canada has the strictest work rules for higher education students in this 
group of countries. Full-time students in Canada (contact hours greater than 15 hours a 
week) are generally not allowed to work while studying. The exceptions to this ruling are 
where a student can demonstrate that work carried out is essential or integral to their course; 
employment relates to an approved research or training program; or they are temporarily 
destitute through circumstances beyond their control.
Post-study work and residency conditions: Students may work for a maximum of one to two 
years following conclusion of their study in an area of employment relating to their course. 
The application for a work permit must occur within 90 days of the student receiving their 
marks.
New Zealand 
The New Zealand visa is known as the Study Visa/Permit.
Visa Cost: US$150 (A$152)
Financial Requirements: Applicants need to demonstrate fi nancial capacity. 
If they have a guarantor, usually a public funding institution, they are simply required to fi ll 
out a form (Financial Undertaking for a Student) and include this with their application form.
Where students do not have a guarantor, for stays of less than 36 weeks, applicants need to 
provide evidence of funds of NZ$1000 for each month of study and for stays of 36 weeks or 
more, applicants need to provide evidence of NZ$10,000 for each year of study. 
This equates to around NZ$30,000 (A$22,915) for a three-year degree. 
Evidence of Funds: Applicants only need to prove the existence of funds, rather than confi rm 
funding sources. Acceptable evidence of funds includes photocopies of: travellers’ cheques; 
bank drafts; letters of credit; and bank statements in the applicant’s name, going back at 
least three months.
Processing Times: Within 14 days, NZ Immigration will either provide a decision, or tell 
applicant how long the processing time is predicted to be.
Work Allowances: Students are allowed to work up to 20 hours a week during the academic 
year. They can work unlimited hours at the end of the academic year during the Christmas 
and New Year break.
Post-study work and residency conditions: At the completion of their studies, overseas 
students in New Zealand can apply for temporary work visas. These are visas released under 
either the: 
Graduate Job Search Policy, where students can apply for a 12 month temporary work visa 
after they fi nish their qualifi cation to work in unrelated areas while they seek employment in 




three months of the end date of their student visa and be able to demonstrate fi nancial 
resources equal to NZ$2,100; or 
Study to Work Policy, where a visa is valid for either two years, to enable students to obtain 
practical experience relating to and suitable for, their New Zealand qualifi cation, or three 
years if they are working to obtain professional recognition from a New Zealand professional 
association. Students need to apply for a visa under this program no later than three months 
after the end date of their study permit. They must be able to demonstrate evidence of an 
offer of employment in an area of expertise related to a three-year qualifi cation. 
Comparing the Five Countries 
The data indicate Australia is distinguishable from the four comparators in fi ve respects. 
First, Australia’s student visa system is substantially more segmented than other systems, 
with two sub class visas for higher education in addition to sub class visas for other areas 
(schools, vocational and ELICOS). In contrast, each of the four comparators has a single 
student visa for higher education which is applicable regardless of course level – although 
the USA also has a separate visa for the relatively small number of vocational education-only 
students.
Second, at $550, the Australian student visa is more expensive, costing almost A$200 more 
than the next most expensive visa (the UK, at A$354). The US, Canada and New Zealand 
charge between A$124 and A$152 for their visas.
Third, the fi nancial requirements for obtaining an Australian student visa are substantially 
greater than those in the comparators and the regulations surrounding them are much more 
prescriptive. Applicants to Australia are required to provide evidence of funding to cover 
tuition and living expenses over their entire course, equal to around A$144,000 for a three 
year course. By way of comparison, among the four comparators, students only need to 
demonstrate a fi nancial capacity in regard to some combination of the fi rst year’s tuition 
and some assessment of their living costs. In the US this is equivalent to one year’s board 
and tuition at a sponsoring institution, equal to around A$40,500. In the UK and Canada, 
this equates to A$23,667 and A$25,310 respectively using reasonable assumptions about 
tuition and living costs. New Zealand has the simplest assessment system of NZ$10,000 per 
annum or NZ$30,000 (A$22,915) for a typical three year degree.
Fourth, and corresponding to the above, much of the collection of this information occurs 
at the institutional level in the four comparators, with ‘sponsoring’ institutions reporting on 
student’s fi nancial viability in the US, and a mix of tuition fees and standard living allowances 
being used in the UK, Canada and New Zealand. In Australia, this information is collected by 
the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. Australia is unique in having an application 
processing that is dependent on differentiated assessment levels for individual countries 
(Assessment Levels 1 to 5) and of different course types (schools; higher education; 
postgraduate research). Such differentiation of source countries into ‘tiers’ is not present in 
the comparator countries. 
Finally, three of the four comparator countries (UK, US and Canada) report statistics on 
student visa processing on a country-by-country basis, while NZ and Australia have stated 
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goals about processing times in general. Australia’s stated goals for processing tend to be 
longer than for those in other countries, particularly in regard to Assessment Level 3 and 4 
countries such as India and China.    
There are two commonalities between Australia and the reference set of countries. First, all 
countries have relatively strict conditions under which students can work. With the exception 
of Canada, they limit work time to no more than 20 hours a week during the academic 
session. In Canada, work restrictions are even tighter. Students have to demonstrate a 
requirement in relation to their coursework or unanticipated fi nancial diffi culty before they are 
granted the right to work.
Second, Australia, the UK and New Zealand have a strict delineation between study and 
temporary work visas, but students having the capacity to articulate to a work visa on the 
basis of their qualifi cation and skill needs within the country. These countries make special 
allowance for former international students to apply for temporary visas. By contrast, the US 
and Canada have provisions attached to their student visa which allow students to work for 
at least one year at the completion of their studies.  
Policy Options for the Australian Student Visa System
The fi ndings of this comparative study indicate that Australia’s student visa policy should be 
reassessed in view of current practice elsewhere. Four key issues emerge, three of which 
pertain to reducing the complexity and fi nancial stringency of the student visa system and the 
last of which pertains to the education/work nexus facing international students:
1. Should Australia have a single, student visa for higher education students, as per the 
reference set of countries considered?
All other countries examined in this comparison have a single entry visa for students, rather 
than a group of sub-class visas. This has the benefi t of simplifying the application process 
for students and reducing administrative burdens where students enter Australia under 
‘package deals’ where they intend to undertake English language instruction or vocational 
and/or educational training prior to entering a university. 
The counter argument to the single student visa concept is that higher education, as the 
most prominent sector in international education in Australia, requires a uniquely recognised 
visa. For this reason, there could be potential benefi t in merging the current sub class visas 
(573 – Higher Education and 574 – Postgraduate) into a single visa covering the entire higher 
education sector. This would serve to streamline entry into undergraduate and ultimately 
postgraduate study in Australia of international students.  
2. Should the fi nancial requirements test be limited to the fi rst year of tuition/living 
expenses as per other countries? 
Australia is unique in requiring proof of fi nancial resources to cover tuition and living expenses 
over the duration of a student’s stay in Australia (in addition to resourcing for spouses and 
dependents, be they in Australia or in the sending country). The other countries in this 
comparison require only proof of funding for the fi rst year’s tuition and living costs for the 
student. In effect, international applicants in Australia’s higher education sector have to 




3. Should there be an emphasis on proof of funds rather than proof of source of funding?
In addition to proving funding, applicants also have to demonstrate funding sources, 
particularly for countries at the Assessment Level 3 or above. Australia’s two largest markets 
for onshore higher education, China and India, are ranked at Assessment Level 4 for 
undergraduate higher education courses, implying that students must provide evidence of 
funding for three to four years of their studies as well as proof of the source of this funding16. 
No other country undertakes this assessment for any country. Removing or modifying this 
test in the context of a reduced requirement to demonstrate fi nancial capacity would serve to 
eliminate a substantial impediment to Australia’s overall competitiveness in the international 
higher education sector. 
One obvious rationale for undertaking this reform is that the test currently punishes higher 
education providers whose students tend to have longer associations with their institutions. 
There is likely to be more vigilance at the institutional level for these students in any case, 
regardless of governmental regulatory requirements on reporting fi nancial capacity.  
4. Should the higher education student visa include a post-study work component?   
Presently, there is a strict delineation between study and work visas in Australia. In contrast, 
in both the US and Canada, students are allowed to work for at least one year after the 
completion of their studies in an area relating to their course. This serves as a bridge between 
study and work which either prepares students to apply for a formal work visa in Australia or 
which better prepares them to enter the workforce in their country of origin.
16 Although in response to lobbying from the sector, the Government has announced in December 2010 that it will 
lower the Assessment Levels for higher education sub visas for India and China to Level 3, commencing April 
2011. See DIAC (2010) ‘Overview of Student Visa Changes to Assist International Education Sector’, http://www.
immi.gov.au/students/_pdf/student-visa-changes.pdf 
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Conclusion
One of the key factors affecting international student participation in Australian higher 
education is the system of student visas. As a result of recent falls in international student 
commencements there has been a renewed call for a revision to student visa policy. This has 
culminated in the establishment of the Knight Review of the Student Visa Program by the 
Commonwealth Government. 
This paper provides evidence and discussion of several policy options in view of a comparative 
analysis of student visa systems in Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada 
and New Zealand. The underlying fi nding from this work is that the Australian student visa 
system is especially complex with regard to the number of visas available to students and in 
the level of stringency applied to tests of fi nancial capacity and proof of funding. In addition, 
Australia has generally less generous post-study employment options under the student visa 
system in comparison with other countries, especially the US and Canada. 
These fi ndings suggest that the Australian system can be streamlined and simplifi ed to make 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































AUSTRALIAN STUDENT VISA POLICY
Appendix Notes
1 Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2010), ‘Overseas Student Program – Assessment 
Levels’, available at:  http://www.immi.gov.au/allforms/pdf/assessment-levels.pdf 
2 US Department of State (2010), ‘Student Visas’, available at:
http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_1268.html 
3 IDP Australia (2010) ‘International Trends in Visa Grants: A lead indicator for future enrolments’,
IDP Australia. 
4 UK Border Agency (2010), ‘Points Based System Tier 4: (General) Student and (Child) Student - 
visa application guide’, available at: http://www.ukvisas.gov.uk/en/howtoapply/infs/inf29pbsstudent 
5 Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2010) , ‘Studying In Canada – Applying for a Study Permit 
Outside Canada’, available at: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/kits/guides/5269E.PDF 
6 Immigration New Zealand (2010) ‘Study Visa/Permit Guide’, available at: http://www.immigration.
govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/8D76710A-1F4A-452F-8C5D-8663738F560A/0/1013.pdf 
7 Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2010), ‘Student Visa Charges’, available at:
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http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_1263.html#temp 
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10 Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2010) , ‘Application to Study in Canada: Study Permits’, 
available at: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/information/applications/student.asp 
11 Immigration New Zealand (2010), ‘Study Visa/Permit Guide’, available at: http://www.immigration.
govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/8D76710A-1F4A-452F-8C5D-8663738F560A/0/1013.pdf 
12 Study in Australia (2010), ‘Student visa’, available at: http://www.studyinaustralia.gov.au/Sia/
en/StudyCosts/Visa estimates annual fees for undergraduate degrees at between $10,000 and 
$16,500 per annum. However, fees are typically higher than this at many universities. For example, 
annual fees for a standard three year commerce degree at ATN universities vary between $19,680 
and $23,000. At Monash and Melbourne Universities, they are over $31,000 in 2011. See
http://www.monash.edu/study/coursefi nder/course/0179/ (for Monash) and http://www.
futurestudents.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_fi le/0005/134969/INT_FEES_2011.pdf
(for Melbourne).
13 University of New Haven (2010), ‘Financial Requirements for International Applicants Seeking an 
I-20 Form’, available at: http://www.newhaven.edu/admissions/internationaladmissions/16386/  
14 Universities UK (2010), ‘International Student Tuition Fees: Survey Results 2009-10’, available at: 
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available at: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/information/applications/student.asp 
16 Canadian Federation of Students (2009), ‘Tuition Fees for International Undergraduate Students’, 
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18 Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2010), ‘Client Services Charter:
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19 US Department of State (2010), ‘Visa Wait Times’, available at:
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20 UK Border Agency (2010), ‘Guide to Visa Processing Times’, available at:
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Outside Canada’, available at: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/kits/guides/5269E.PDF 
22 Immigration New Zealand (2010), ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, available at:
http://www.immigration.govt.nz/faqs/ 
23 Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2010), ‘Fact Sheet: Permission to Work’, available at:  
http://www.immi.gov.au/students/_pdf/permission-to-work-students.pdf 
24 US Immigration Support (2010), ‘US Immigration Support’, available at:
https://www.usimmigrationsupport.org/f1-student-visa.html 
25 UK Border Agency (2010), ‘Points Based System Tier 4: (General) Student and (Child) 
Student - visa application guide’, available at: http://www.ukvisas.gov.uk/en/howtoapply/infs/
inf29pbsstudent#21979526 
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temp/types/types_1271.html 
32 UK Border Agency (2010), ‘Points Based System Tier 4: (General) Student and (Child) 
Student - visa application guide’, available at:  http://www.ukvisas.gov.uk/en/howtoapply/infs/
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